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ESTIMATION OF TAX EVASION AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
TAX COLLECTION FOR THAILAND
ABSTRACT
Low tax revenue is an acute problem for the Thai Government, one which causes a lack
of funds for much needed economic and social development. The cause of the low tax
revenue is ineffective tax administration. Thus the purpose of this research was to
measure the tax effectiveness in Thailand.
The review presents the popular Tanzi’s monetary approach for estimating the level of
tax evasion and it has resulted in the hypothesis that tax evasion generally increases
alongside the growth of the economy. However, his approach overlooks two aspects
which reduce the accuracy of the findings: velocity of money and the legal effect of the
tax rate. Thus, in this research, some adaptations were made in order to achieve more
accurate estimation. The model was applied to macro-economic data from sources such
as Bank of Thailand and Eco Win database covering period 1980 to 2006 and results
indicated that tax evasion during this period was probably in the region of 5.5-15%.
Figures suggest firstly that as the economy has grown, tax evasion has reduced, but that
secondly, the least tax evasion occurred during the economic crisis of 1997. The former
finding corresponds to the research by IMD surveys (2005) which showed that highly
developed countries have low tax evasion. The latter finding was tested for structural
break and the results support the view that there is no change in behavior during the
crisis but that the high drop of tax evasion is caused by both the legal and illegal effects
of tax rate.
In addition, another method for estimating tax evasion, Tax Compliance Measurement
Program (TCMP), was applied in measuring the individual tax auditor performance.
This applied method is a good incentive for tax auditors to improve their effectiveness
in detecting more tax evasion.
Supervision:
Main Supervisor: Dr Bibhas Saha
Support Supervisor: Dr Peter Moffatt
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61 INTRODUCTION
The Thai economy had grown rapidly during 1985 – 1996 until it faced a setback in the
1997 financial crisis. After that, the economy recovered with per capita GDP at $3,732
in 2007 but it did not grow as fast as earlier. Despite its fair economic performance, the
income of 84% of Thai workforces does not reach the first threshold for individual
income tax because of poor income redistribution and poverty. To address the problem
of poverty, the Thai government needs to develop the country’s social and educational
institutions. However, it does not have sufficient funds, partly due to low tax revenue
and high corruption. For Thailand the share of tax revenue in GDP was 14.4% for the
period 1996-2002 (it was 16.2% during 1990-195) (Table 1). This is less than the share
of the tax revenue-GDP ratio of the median developing country, which was 19.2 % in
1996-2002 (and 18.7 during 1990-95). Resolving the low tax revenue problem would
contribute to developing education and create a more qualified workforce, thus
increasing the percentage of Thais who could contribute to the revenue.
Table 1 Total Government Tax Revenue as Percentage of GDP, 1990-1995 and
1996-2002. (Number of countries and median values of the sampling
averages)
1990 to 1995 1996 to 2001 Direction of change
Countries Median Countries Median Down up
Developed countries 21 37.8 21 40.1 3 18
Transitional economies 14 34.7 14 31.4 12 2
Developing countries 13 18.7 13 19.2 5 8
Thailand 1 18.6 1 16.8 1
Note Average taken by median value of simple average.
Source: UNPAN Statistical Database
Source: Fiscal Policy Office, Ministry of Finance (Thailand)
Two main causes of the low tax revenue are defined as the ineffective tax administration,
and corruption (Schaffer & Turley, 2000). In addition, this study suggests that poverty
is another cause of the low tax revenue. Figure 1 shows that the effective tax rate for
Thailand has been more or less increasing with per capita GDP from 1980 onward, with
some exceptions, such as the period preceding 1992 and the period of financial crisis
(1997). Though per capita GDP picked up the momentum from 1998 onward, the
effective tax rate began to rise only after 2000. Moreover, the fall in the effective tax
rate was very sharp during the crisis (3 percentage point, or nearly 25% - from 19% to
15%), while the per capita GDP fell 50,000 Baht to 45,000 Baht (10% fall). In 1992 a
major tax reform was undertaken and this seemed to have produced some result as the
7effective tax rate increased after 1992 after an earlier fall between 1988 and 1992. Table
1 presents the international comparison of the tax revenue-GDP ratio of Thailand and
other countries. The Thai ratio is smaller than the median developing countries by about
1 percentage point, and this gap widened for the period 1996-2001. The same ratio for
the developed countries is more than twice as large, and for the transition economies it
is nearly twice as larger. This research attempts to estimate the effectiveness of tax
collection, and identify the reasons for low tax revenues.
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Figure 1 Relationship between income and tax revenue in Thai economy
Source: National account, Office of the National Economic and Social Development
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1.1 ASSUMPTIONS AND DEFINITIONS
The main assumption for estimating the tax effectiveness, referring to Tanzi’s monetary
approach, is the positive relationship between a tax rate and tax evasion (Clotfelter,
1983). Increasing tax rates stimulates tax evading activities by using currency to conceal
illegal transactions from being detected. This illegal money can be used to estimate the
underground economy by comparison with the total money circulating in the economic
system. Normally, the velocity of money represents the amount in circulation in the
economic system. However, the velocity of illegal money is unknown. Thus the second
assumption is that the velocity of illegal money is assumed to be equal to the velocity of
8broad money. The reason is that illegal currency is switched from bank transactions
which are referred to deposits and the deposits are a majority of broad money. Then it
could be said that the ratio of illegal currency to broad money represent the ratio of
underground economy or tax evasion rates. For this reason, the definitions of the
estimated underground economy and tax evasion in this research are different from the
normal definitions. Generally, underground/hidden/shadow economy includes various
illegal activities but the underground economy in this research is estimated from the
changes in tax rates, so it is specific to only the tax evasion activities. In this paper, the
definition of the tax evasion refers to tax evasion using currency to evade tax; it does
not include and tax evasion by distortion and corruption. Other definitions are shown as
follows.
Effective tax rates are the realized average tax rates (Schaffer, Turley et al., 2000). They
can be calculated as collected tax revenues over their tax bases, the detail of calculation
can be seen in Mendoza et al (1994)
Currency (C) in Chapter 3 model focuses on only the currency circulation outside the
financial institutes.
Narrow money1 (M1) is the money in public circulation comprising banknotes and
coins, plus business and household call deposits in the commercial banking system.
Broad money (M2) is the money in public circulation comprising banknotes, coins, and
call deposits (i.e., narrow money, M1) plus business and household time and savings
deposits in the commercial banking system, plus promissory notes or deposits in the
finance and finance & securities companies.
1
Definitions of narrow and broad money are from the central bank of Thailand according to Monetary
and Financial Statistics Manual 1990
92 THAI TAX SYSTEM AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
This review gives the circumstances of the research question and relevant constrains of
the Thai tax system. In addition, the review also gives you the background of tax
evasion measurement, especially monetary approaches which were developed from
Tanzi’s (1983). The tax evasion is the key variable to estimate the tax effectiveness.
2.1 OVERVIEW OF THE THAI SYSTEM
The overview of Thai taxation is obtained from the Tax Policy Bureau (2005) and
Sujjapongse (2005). It provides tax structure for both central and local government, tax
rate, previous tax reforms, present circumstances, and problems. This information was
considered when researching the question and detailed estimation can be found in
chapter 3.
2.1.1 THAI TAX STRUCTURE
Tax can be classified by two methods. The first method is to classify tax by resources of
income such as profit, labor force income, and goods & services transactions which
taxes apply to. In Thailand, there are seven central government taxes and two local
administrations’ taxes. Only the five predominant tax categories of government revenue
are considered in research estimation. They are individual and corporate income taxes,
value added taxes, excise taxes and custom duties. The second method classifies tax by
types of participants, either as earners or consumers who pay direct and indirect taxes
respectively. The direct taxes which apply directly to earners comprise of individual
income tax, corporate income tax and local levied taxes. As local levied taxes only
make up a minor share of total government revenue, they will not be considered in this
research. The tax burdens of indirect taxes are carried more by consumers and earners
carry indirectly less as lower sales and income. The indirect taxes collected by the
central government are value added taxes, specific business taxes, stamp duties, excise
taxes and customs duties. The remaining surcharges on central government tax are
collected by local administrations.
Thus, the following sections will firstly present Thai taxation responding by the central
government and local administrations, and then the direct and indirect tax will be
considered in circumstance of Thai taxation and tax reforms.
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1. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE
Central government revenue is the major revenue of total revenue at 87%; the remains
are local government revenue, profit from state-enterprises and grants. The seven taxes
collected by central government consist of 1) individual income tax, 2) corporate
income tax, 3) value added tax, 4) specific business tax 5) stamp duty 6) excise tax, and
7) custom duties. The details of each tax presents as follows.
1.1 Individual income tax is imposed at progressive rates between 10% and 37%
on taxable income for individual residing in Thailand for more than 180 days in any tax
year (Table 2). In addition, income from financial asset is taxed at the rate of 15%.
Table 2 Individual income tax rates
Taxable income Tax rate Proportion of
(Baht)1 (Percentage)1 Workers2 Tax revenue2, 3
Less than 0 No Tax 83.96% -
0 - 100,000 Period exemption จ4.64% 00.03%
100,000 - 500,000 10 09.89% 13.46%
500,000 - 1,000,000 20 01.05% 21.04%
1,000,000 - 4,000,000 30 00.43% 40.15%
Over 4,000,000 37 00.03% 25.32%
Source: 1 Fiscal Policy Office, Ministry of Finance
2 The Revenue Department in 2006
Remark: 3 Including taxes from financial assets
1.2 Corporate Income tax is normally applied to the net profit at 30%. However,
there are reduced rates for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and other
qualifying organizations (Table 3). The highest rate applied is to petroleum companies
at the rate of 50% of net income.
1.3 Value added tax (VAT) was introduced on 1st January, 1992 to replace the
business tax. It is a sales tax for normal goods and services at a rate of 7%. Exports to
some destinations are exempt at 0%.
1.4 Specific business tax is a sales tax for businesses with value added which are
difficult to define, such as financial and real estate businesses. The tax rate ranges
between 2.5% and 3.0% of gross receipts for the central government and 10% for the
local government.
11
Table 3 Corporate income tax rates
Taxpayer Tax base Rate (%)
1. Small company with paid up capital less than 5
million Baht at the end of each accounting period
Net profit not exceeding 1 million Baht 15
Net profit over 1 million Baht up to 3 million
Baht
25
Net profit exceeding 3 million Baht 30
2. Companies listed in Stock Exchange of Thailand
(SET)
Net profit for first 300 million Baht 25
Net profit for the amount exceeding 300 million
Baht
Remark; both for first five accounting periods
after listing
30
3. Company newly listed in Stock Exchange of
Thailand (SET)
Net profit 25
4. Company newly listed in Market for Alternative
Investment (MAI)
Net profit for first five accounting periods after
listing
20
5. Bank deriving profits from international
Banking Facilities (IBF)
Net profit 10
6. Foreign company engaged in international
transportation
Gross receipts 3
7. Foreign company not carrying on business in
Thailand receiving dividends from Thailand
Gross receipts 10
8. Foreign company not carrying on business in
Thailand receiving dividends from Thailand
Gross receipts 15
9. Foreign company disposing profit out of
Thailand
Amount disposed 10
10. Profitable association and foundation Gross receipts 2 or 10
11. Regional Operational Headquarters (ROH) Income from servicing subsidiaries of ROH 10
Interest received from subsidiaries of ROH and
Royalty fee research and development (R&D)
received from subsidiaries, branch or other
company
Source: Fiscal Policy Office, Ministry of Finance
1.5 Stamp duty is a form of taxation on documents and transactions which
require stamps to be affixed on. These are mainly government forms, legal contracts and
other instruments. Stamp duty is set up at various rates ranging from 1/1000 baht to
100/1000 baht depending on the class of the document.
1.6 Excise tax is a sales tax for selectively restricted commodities such as
petroleum, tobacco and some luxury goods. This tax, which is an instrument to promote
social responsibility, is categorized into the following four groups:
 Harmful products and services for public health
 Against moral products and services
 Luxury products and services
 Concessionary products and services by the government
1.7 Custom duties are collected from prices of cargoes, insurances, and freight
(CIF). According to the Harmonized System, their rates range between 0% and 10%
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depending on production processes, with the exception of automobiles at a rate of 80%.
The three targeted production processes are:
a) 1% for raw materials and inputs not produced locally
b) 5% for semi-finished products
c) 10% for finished products, products requiring extra protection, and luxury goods
The seven types of taxes mentioned above are collected by three departments under the
Ministry of Finance.
a) The Department of Revenue is responsible for individual income tax, corporate
income tax, petroleum tax, VAT, special business tax, etc.
b) The Department of Excise collects all excise tax.
c) The Department of Customs administers import and export duties.
2. LOCAL ADMINISTRATIONS’ REVENUE
Local governments heavily rely on obtaining a share of central government’s tax
revenue to fund its activities. There are over 7700 local governments in Thailand which
are categorized as follows:
 Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (province)
 Provincial Administrative Organization (province)
 Pattaya City (amphoe2)
 Municipality (province, amphoe, and tambon3)
 Tambon Administrative Organization (tambon)
The primary sources of local administrations’ revenue are local levied taxes, surcharges
on central government tax, shared revenue, revenue transfers, and government grants.
2.1 Local levied taxes are the direct taxes which is administrated and collected by
the local administration. These can be classified into two groups of organizations which
collect taxes, namely:
2
It is like a district, the second level administrative subdivision of Thailand, subdivision from province.
3
It is the third level local government below amphoe.
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 Municipality (Tessaban), Tambon Administrative Organization (TAOs),
Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) and Pattaya City. These
taxes are land and building tax, land development tax, slaughter tax, and
fee, fine and license.
 Provincial Administrative Organizations (PAOs). These taxes are hotel
tax, petrol stations tax, and retail tobacco tax.
2.2 Surcharge on government tax is usually an additional 10% on top of
government tax less 5% for collection expenditure. This tax is added on VAT (added
11.11%), excise tax, retail liquor license, gambling license, and gambling tax on horse
racing (added 2.5%).
2.3 Shared revenue is collected by the government and shared with the local
administration, which includes:
 A 5% share of VAT collected in very province except BMA. This share
is transferred to PAO and then transferred to all local administrations
according to the Decentralization Act.
 60% of mineral and petroleum tax distributed by the source of revenue
2.4 Revenue transfer is collected by government agencies and transferred to
local administrations by the source of revenue. These transfers are motor vehicle tax,
motor registration fees and real estate registration fees.
Moreover, other departments in other ministries are empowered to levy other related
charges or fees. For instance, the department of mineral resources collects royalties for
mineral exports and the Department of Land collects registration fees on transfer of land
ownership.
2.1.2 TAX REFORM, PRESENT SITUATION AND PROBLEMS
1. Major tax reforms
Taxes in Thailand have been reformed several times but there are only three major
reforms since the 1990s. These reforms relate to 1) Income tax, 2) Value added tax and
3) customs tariff. The tax rates of income taxes have been decreased from the highest
level at 55% to 37% of individual income and decreased from 50% to 30% of corporate
14
income. The second reform is the change from business tax to value added tax in 1992.
For the third reform, the Thai government applied a three-rate framework of custom
duties from WTO in 2002.
2. Present circumstance and issues for tax administration
2.1 Low tax base
The tax revenue collected by the Thai government is relatively low in comparison with
other countries (Table 1). The effective tax rates of the Thai government are less than
the medians of three groups of countries. This is looked into the research question.
Figure 1 presents the change in Thai effective tax rate. Two significant drops in the
effective tax rate since 1990 were caused by 1) the imposition of value added tax in
1992, and 2) the 1997 financial crisis. However, after recovering from the crisis, the
effective tax rate dramatically increased to the previous stage.
Analysis of the data identify that the causes of the problem are 1) comparatively low
statutory tax rates and 2) the ineffective tax administration. The Thai effective tax rate
was significant less than other developing countries’ from 1996 to 2001 (Table 1)
because the Thai economy was seriously suffering from the 1997 crisis. Thus the low
tax revenue during this period was due to the external economy and the problem of
ineffective tax administration is not as serious as previously thought. However, with the
level of country development (new industrialize country), the effective tax rate should
not be less than the median of the developing group’s. The reviewed data presented
below show that Thailand’s statutory tax rates are less than other countries’ tax rates
and there is high tax evasion.
The low tax revenue can be explained as both low tax rate and indirect impacts. By
considering the main taxes of Thai central government, Thailand’s VAT rate (7%) is
less than the average VAT of 59 countries at 16.7% (world-wide.com), or the average
indirect tax rate of 104 countries at 15.7% (KPMG.com). This significant difference in
tax rate (around 9%) can create sufficient tax revenue for the government and push
Thailand’s effective tax rate to be possibly higher than the median of other developing
countries.
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Tax exemption and poverty indirectly causes the comparatively low tax rate. The
numerous tax exemptions and tax evasion are mentioned to be the reasons of the low tax
base of the Thai government (Sujjapongse, 2005). Over 50 contents of both tax
exemptions and deductible expenses lead to a smaller tax base. However, those
exemptions cannot be powerful without poverty. Poverty and the income disparity are
the primary problems for the Thai government. Per capita GDP of Thailand at $2,539 is
smaller than the average of the World and the United States at $6,570 and $39,883
respectively (source from UNDP, 2004). In addition, Thailand’s Gini coefficient is
0.493 above 0.4; this implies that there is high inequality of income distribution in
Thailand. According to the filing of the Revenue Department, there were 5.7 million
taxpayers for individual income tax out of 35.7 million people in employment in 2006
(16.03%). This data corresponds with the analysis from the report of the 2004
household socio-economic survey of the whole country by National Statistical Office
which shows that only 15.71% of the workforces are taxpayers (Figure 2). Around
84.29% of labor force receives an annual income of less than the threshold of the
individual income tax of 100,000 baht. This percentage includes taxpayers who have
reached the threshold level but do not reach the 100,000 baht level after deducting tax
exemptions. The poverty and tax exemptions result in a potential 61.74% of total
individual income being lost. These imply that not only lessening the tax exemptions
can promote the tax revenue but also alleviate poverty by providing the government
more funding for public services.
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Figure 2 Lorenz curve diagram of Thai context in 2004
Source: Report of the 2004 Household Socio-Economic Survey Whole Kingdom,
National Statistical Office, Ministry of Information and Communication Technology
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The high amount of tax evasion is another cause of low tax revenue. The amount of
Thai tax evasion was estimated by several researchers. The first is tax evasion of
individual income tax; tax evaders were estimated at over 4 million of 10 million
taxpayers (40%) (Sujjapongse, 2005). The second is tax evaders of corporate income tax;
the surveying results present that for every 100 registered firms, another 16 firms were
unregistered (Poapongsakorn, 2000). These 2 types of tax evasion represent the large
proportion of tax evaders. If tax administrators can control the evasion well, not only
will tax revenue increase, it will also help promote horizontal equity for the other honest
taxpayers.
For these three causes of the low tax revenue problem, an integral solution is needed to
solve the problem systematically. Some possible solutions include 1) a tax reform; this
is a method to adjust tax rates to increase tax revenue. A tax reform must be considered
under various conditions such as the four goals of tax reform; changes in tax evasion,
circumstance of economy and fiscal policy, and expected government expenditure. 2)
Effective budget allocation for the three main tax departments can drive the effective
tax administration to the optimum point. This occurs under the assumption of
diminishing returns of scale when marginal tax revenue is equal to marginal collecting
cost in each department. 3) Reward incentives can be used to control the corruption and
tax evasion in taxation, and 4) fiscal policies should be set up with an emphasis on an
escape from poverty trap and an income disparity to increase the base income of the
workforce.
2.2 Composition of tax revenue and tax burden from the direct and indirect taxes
As mention earlier, the majority of Thai tax revenue are collected from five main taxes.
Figure 2 illustrates the average composition of tax revenue during fiscal years 1998 -
2003. In decreasing order of contribution, Value Added Tax is the largest share at 27%,
followed by Excise Tax, Corporate income tax, individual income tax, custom duties,
and other taxes. The contributing share of custom duties has gradually declined due to
the Thai government entering trade liberalization commitments such as World Trade
Organization, Asian Free Trade Area and other Free Trade Agreements. The smallest
contributing share is other taxes collected by the local administration. Due to the small
tax income earnings from local administration, the government issued a decentralised
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strategy via tax reform policies to raise the share for the local government from 20% of
the central government revenue in 2001 to over than 35% in 2006.
If indirect taxes, which are constant tax rates, are defined as effective regressive tax
rates as opposed to progressive, then the tax burden is heavier on consumers than
suppliers or producers who earn the income from selling goods and services. (Chernick
& Reschovsky, 2000; Sujjapongse, 2005). Considering the tax burden issue begins with
the composition of government revenue in terms of the direct and indirect taxes (Figure
3). The total government revenue comprises of indirect taxes (58%), direct taxes (30%)
and not-tax revenue (12%). This highlights that the Thai government’s revenue heavily
relies on the indirect taxes, similar to other developing countries in Asia and Oceania
(Table 4). Economists such as Sujjapongse, Chernick and Reschovsky believe the high
indirect tax revenue increases income disparity. They believe that indirect taxes are
regressive taxes for two main reasons: 1) there is a higher saving rate of the rich than
the poor, so the poor are taxed at a higher ratio of their incomes than the rich (Creedy,
1998); 2) they only considered certain kinds of necessary goods, such as gasoline,
which are consumed by the poor at similar amounts as the rich, thus the ratio of its tax
to the poor’s income is higher than to the rich (Chernick & Reschovsky, 2000). These
reasons lead to the belief that the indirect taxes are regressive taxes and that their high
burden on poor consumers will enlarge the income disparity.
Personal Income
Tax, 647.6 , 14%
Corporate
Income Tax,
882.8 , 19%
Value Added
Tax, 1,331.7 ,
27%
Excise Taxes,
1,122.7 , 24%
Custom Duties,
517.8 , 11%
Others, 237.2 ,
5%
Figure 2 Composition of tax revenue (in percent). Fiscal years 1998-2003, Unit:
Billion of Baht, Percent
Source: Fiscal Policy Office, Ministry of Finance
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Direct Tax
30%
Indirect Tax
58%
Non-Tax Revenue
12%
Figure 3 Share of Total Government Revenues (In Total) Fiscal Year 1998-2003
Source: Fiscal Policy Office, Ministry of Finance
Table 4 Composition of government revenue
Government revenue (1990-2002) Direct Tax Indirect Tax
Developed countries 63.3 28.6
Transitional economies 51.0 45.1
Developing countries 28.3 57.9
Asia and Oceania 34.1 60.4
Thailand 29.8 58.5
Note Average taken by median value of simple average.
Source: UNPAN Statistical Database
Source: Fiscal Policy Office, Ministry of Finance
However, a review by Creedy (1998) presents reasonable evidence arguing that indirect
taxes are progressive. He argues against the smaller tax ratio due to higher savings of
the rich, saying that multi-period consideration should be taken into account. Savings
will be spent in the future, which will then be taxed at that point. Furthermore, the rich
have to pay interest income tax, which is paid less by the poor with fewer savings. From
this, it can be concluded that savings is not a reason to support that indirect taxes are
regressive. Excise taxes for necessary goods, such as gasoline, are not set up to alleviate
income disparity. They are set up to promote the social development. In isolation,
certain types of indirect taxes are regressive but overall, indirect taxes are progressive.
This is because food, the major share of goods consumed by the poor, is exempted from
VAT, while many luxury goods are charged with both VAT and excise taxes. Thus poor
consumers in Thailand pay much less indirect taxes than the rich. Whenever the overall
indirect taxes are progressive, no matter what burdens of the indirect taxes are borne by
consumers or earners, they help alleviate the income disparity.
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3. Future direction of tax reform
Thailand’s roadmap for tax reform has been in operation since the last financial crisis in
1997. The increase in tax revenue since then is a good developing sign (Figure 1).
However, the goals of the tax reform are not to maximize the tax revenue but to
consider carefully the following framework.
1. Achieving poverty alleviation and reducing income disparity
2. Promoting national competitiveness
3. Promoting social development
4. Furthering fiscal decentralization
This background of Thai taxation will be considered as the research question and
relevant constrain in this research. The next section is the review of theory used in this
research.
2.2 LITERATURE: MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS OF TAX COLLECTION
Low tax revenue is an interesting issue for many economists. This can be resolve by
promoting the tax effectiveness. However, how can this effectiveness be measured?
Effective tax administration of Transition Economies is measured and compared
through the
)(
)(
SratetaxStatutory
EratetaxEffective ratio with the benchmark at the mature market
economies of the European Union. The research results suggest a positive correlation
between the progress of the transition and the effective tax administration (Schaffer &
Turley, 2000). However, it can be argued that this ratio presents the composition of tax
base, after deducting tax exemption, to the total tax base without considering tax
evasion. The effective tax rate is calculated from the tax revenue over tax base. Both the
figure of the tax revenue and the tax base are based on legal records, so the calculation
of the effective tax rate does not include loss in taxation from tax evasion. Thus the E/S
ratio does not represent the true effective tax administration. In addition, poor citizens in
developing countries have the tendency to spend more proportion of their income on
tax-exempted food than in developed countries, therefore the E/S ratio of developing
countries are usually lower than the developed countries’. This research will seek to find
a method to measure the effectiveness of tax collection through the underground
economy and tax evasion.
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To measure the tax effectiveness, this research begins with the defined equation of the
effectiveness of tax collection (Ef), which is calculated from the collected tax revenue
(Tx) over the estimated total tax revenue including tax evasion (TE) in the underground
economy as equation (1). Where i represents one type of the five main taxes;
ii
i
i TETx
Tx
Ef

 (1)
2.2.1 ESTIMATION FOR TAX EVASION
This review presents two methods for the estimation of tax evasion: tax evasion that has
been detected by the auditors and undetected in the underground economy. The former
method is called “Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP)” (Clotfelter,
1983) and the latter is the monetary approach of Tanzi (1983).
The TCMP is a simple statistical method which compares the amount of taxpayers or
the value of reported income by taxpayers. The reported income will be classified into
‘tax due or underreported income’, ‘correct’, and ‘tax refund or overreported income’.
The refund is defined as an unintentional error term, which should be equal on both
sides of underreporting and overreporting. Therefore the unintentional error term on the
underreported side is named as an error term reflecting a mistake. The tax due
comprises of the error term reflecting a mistake and a deliberate evasion. If there is a
significant difference between the tax due and the tax refund, it is assumed to be the
statistical tax evasion as follow.
%Tax evasion = % Tax due –% Tax refund (2)
This estimated tax evasion is already included in the recorded tax revenue because the
tax due has already been detected. Then this estimated tax evasion cannot represent the
leak of tax revenue as in the equation (1). It could be said that the definition is different
between tax evasion detected in the tax system and the undetected tax evasion in the
underground economy. The tax evasion for this research will be focused only from that
of the underground economy. The size of the underground economy can be estimated by
direct and indirect methods. The direct method surveys both underground outputs and
their demands for labor or expenditure. This method has an advantage as it goes into
detail of each type of hidden activity. However, it is time consuming, costly and
requires much manpower to conduct. This surveying method had been used during
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1993-1995 in Thailand. The underground economy is estimated to be around 8 – 13 %
of Thailand’s GDP (Phongpaichit, Piriyarangsan, & Trirat, 2000). This is a good
reference for comparison with the indirect estimation in this research.
The five indirect methods for estimating the underground economy comprise of the
monetary approach (Tanzi, 1983), Labor force participation rate (Lemieux, 1994),
Electricity consumption method (Kaufmann & Kaliberda, 1996; Lacko, 2000),
Discrepancy Approach (Erard, 1997) and MIMIC model: Multiple Indicators, Multiple
Causes model (Giles, 1999). Money, labor forces and electricity consumption variables
are similar elements in both legal and illegal activities. Monetary approach, electricity
consumption discrepancy approach and MIMIC model are used to estimate with
secondary data while labor force participation rate needs surveying for the proportion of
illegal labor forces. In the discrepancy approach, the underground economy is defined
as the gap between an income-base and an expenditure-base of national account. This
method is the easiest to arrive at an estimated outcome, but it has big weakness because
of distortion. Both recorded income and expenditure do not contain hidden expenditure
and income as taxpayers wish to evade direct and indirect taxes by underreported
income and expenditure, respectively. As such, it cannot be said that the statistical
discrepancy represents the size of underground economy as it is based on incorrect
inputs. The MIMIC model is a statistical regression model which either use a mix of all
or some of the other approaches depending on the researcher, to formulate indicators for
this model. This research will consider three methods: electricity consumption method,
monetary approach and the MIMIC model. Due to the limited budget and time for this
research, these three are reasonable and practical methods and will be considered in
detail to indicate the most suitable method for this research question.
The Monetary approach was first used by Cagan (1958). The underground transaction is
assumed to rely on the currency (i.e. hard cash) for avoiding the auditing resource and
destination of money. Monetary approach can also be divided into two methods;
currency ratio comparison and currency demand model. The currency ratio (Currency in
circulation: C to Demand deposits: D) is assumed to remain constant for any period
(Gutmann, 1977). If there is excessive currency ratio over the minimum ratio which was
calculated at WWII, it implies that the excessive currency is used in the underground
economy. The estimated result of the underground economics of USA was around 9.4%
in 1976. The currency ratio is adapted by Feige (1979). The assumption is that the
22
underground economy depends on big bank note multiply by the number of lifetimes of
each bank note per GNP and at the minimum ratio of big bank note, it is assumed that
there is no underground economy. Using this method, the underground economy of
USA was estimated at 19.1% in 1976, 9.7% more than the result of Guttman. Their
assumptions of a minimum ratio equating to no underground economy was heavily
criticized by other economists. Feige (1989) then developed a benchmark by comparing
formal currency ratio and informal currency ratio as  
 Dk
DkCYYu 10
0
0


 , where k0
represents the ratio of the stock of currency in the formal sector to the stock of demand
deposits in the formal sector. However, this is still the unpopular constant ratio. In the
same period, the currency demand model of Cagan was adapted by Tanzi (1983). In
their models, the currency ratio at the state of no underground economy can be changed
reasonably according to the circumstances of the economy. Both models are almost the
same except the technique to estimate and the adding up ratio of wages and salaries to
national income (WS/NI) in the Tanzi’s model. The detail of Tanzi’s model contains the
following variables. The ratio of currency holdings (C) to money (defined as M2) is the
dependent variable varying to an average income tax variable (T), the ratio of wages and
salaries to national income (WS/NI), the deposits rate (R), real per capita income (Y),
and error term ( ). Thus,
   YaRa
NI
WSaTaa
M
C lnlnln1ln
2
ln 43210 (3)
The expected correlate signs for first two variables are positive and the following two
variables are negative. Tax rate is the key variable to estimate the underground economy
and tax evasion because an increase in tax rate creates incentive for taxpayers to evade
more tax. They have to hide their income by using more currency. Thus the relationship
between currency and tax rate is positive (Clotfelter, 1983). Secondly, wages and
salaries, which are the majority share of National Income, are paid by cash. Increasing
wages and salaries requires more currency for payment. Thirdly, deposit rates have a
direct effect on individuals by forcing them to make the decision of holding currency or
saving it. High interest rate encourages people to save more money and hold less
currency. The last variable, per capita income, represents the technology of bank
transactions. Improved technology such as credit cards can reduce the incentive to hold
currency. These are the reasons of expected sign of each relationship variables.
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The process of estimation of the underground economy and tax evasion begins with the
calculation of the difference in currency between general holding for both legal and
illegal transactions ( Cˆ ) at recorded tax rate and holding for only legal transactions (Cˆˆ )
at zero tax rate; they are shown as equation (4) and (5). When tax rate is equal to zero, it
is assumed that there is no tax evasion because there is no need to evade tax. Evading
tax need some specific costs such as distortion costs.
  YaRaNIWSaTaaMCi lnlnln1lnexpˆ 432102  (4)
  YaRaNIWSaaaMCi lnlnln01lnexp
ˆˆ
432102  (5)
This difference in currency or the excessive currency ( CC ˆˆˆ  ) is defined as illegal
money. This can be converted into the underground economy by multiplying the
difference by the velocity of legal money (v). Legal money is calculated by subtracting
the illegal money from narrow money (M1).
Legal money = M1 – illegal money = M1 – ( CC
ˆˆˆ  ) (6)
moneylegal
GDPv  (7)
Underground economy vCC  )ˆˆˆ( (8)
The estimated underground economy was around 5.49% of GNP in 1976 and the
underground economy had grown gradually since the mid-1960s. Tax evasion can be
calculated from underground economy by multiplying by the effective tax rate.
Tax evasion = Underground economy T (9)
Tax evasion in the United States, estimated by Tanzi, increased dramatically with a high
acceleration from $7.73 billions in 1976 to $15.01 billions in 1980.
The idea of the MIMIC model begins with denoting the underground economy as a
‘latent’ variable. It then uses the derive method to calculate the latent variable from two
regression equations: an indicator equation and a cause equation. Both equations vary
according to each author. The MIMIC model, firstly, has been used to estimated the
hidden economy by Frey and Weck-Hanneman (1984). They measure the hidden
economy as the unobserved variable through the LISREL (liner interdependent structure
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relationship) model, a generalization of the MIMIC. The causal equation contained four
factors: the burden of taxation; the tax morality; the rate of unemployment; and the level
of development of the economy. These panel data of OECD countries were constructed
along with the two indicators, the growth rate of official real GDP and the participation
rate of the labor market. Just like the DYMIMIC model of Aigner and et al (1988) was
applied the lagged latent variable in the model and the model was trialed for the optimal
causal and indicator variables. These two models, LISREL and DYMIMIC, are not used
in this research because of the limited data of the participation rate in labor market.
Without the labor market data, the MIMIC model will left only the monetary and
National account data as the MIMIC model of Giles (1999). He set the money demand
as the indicator of the underground economy (10) and the hidden economy ratio as the
cause equation (11). Money demand (M3) depends on recorded income (Yr), hidden
income (Yh), short term interest rate (R) and price level (P) while the hidden economy
depends on Goods and Services Tax (GST), recorded income and price level.

 43210 ttHtRtt PRYYM  (10)
 ttRtt
Rt
Ht PPYGST
Y
Y logloglog 54321 






 (11)
By substituting equation (11) into (10) and thereby cancelling out the derived hidden
income variable (YHt), it will become the MIMIC model. The next step is to estimate the
output of the model, which can now be done without the hidden income variable or the
latent variable. From this estimation, the hidden income is derived. The result shows the
hidden economy is on average less than 9% of recorded GDP and varies between 6.8-
11.3% from 1968-1994. There are several weak points in this model that should be
considered. The first point is that M3 varies only with the supply side, such as foreign
transferred money and. M1, which is controlled by the Central bank. It is difficult to use
M3 to explain the relationship between the underground economy and money.
According to monetary approach assumption, when participants hide their transaction in
the underground economy, they will switch from using bank transactions to currency
transactions (D to C). The amount of money does not change in these transactions but
the underground income rises. Another weakness is that many relationships of the
variables in equation (11) are difficult to use to explain the cause of change in hidden
income.
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The last method is the electricity method by Lacko (2000). This model also contains the
latent variable, but the electricity consumption is used as the indicator of the
underground economy instead of the money variable. It is interesting to note that in this
method, two types of tax rate variables are used in the model; individual and corporate
income tax rates. This shows the different influences of each tax rate on evading
incentives and provides a good explanation for the change in hidden economy for each
tax. However, the electricity method cannot explain the change in the hidden economy
from evading activities of other types of indirect taxes and there is no enough recorded
data of electricity consumption in Thailand,
In conclusion, with the limited data base and the focusing at tax evasion, this research
will rely on the Tanzi monetary approach because the other alternative methods focus at
the underground economy, which may be declared transactions and income or/and taxed
to laundered money.
Recent estimations of the underground economy and tax evasion are base on money
approach of Tanzi. Three other monetary models adapting from Tanzi are: 1) Aslam
(1998), 2) Hill and Kabir (2000), 3) Maurin (2006). These models can be examined for
four main different points, as shown in Table 5, and their strengths and weaknesses will
be considered for setting up the monetary approach model in the Thai context in the
next chapter.
The first point is the difference in variables. Most variables refer to Tanzi’s approach
but some variables are adjusted and added up for each country. However, the main
purpose of examining the tax evasion rate from the relationship between currency and
tax rate remains the same. These variables can be categorized into five groups:
 Group of money: This represents the dependent variable. This contains CFCA -
currency in circulation + foreign currency accounts, C - currency outside other
depository, and M2 - broad money.
 Group of tax rate: This is a key variable to estimate the tax evading activities. It
contains TT - Income tax rate for Tanzi, and TGDP or M
M
Y
T - an effective tax rate
in terms of the ratio of total tax revenues to GDP, terms used by Aslam and
Maurin, respectively.
 Group of interest rate: This contains INT and R - deposit rate.
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 Group of money transactions: This contains WS - wages and salaries, NI -
National income, YA - Growth rate of real GDP, and X - nominal personal
expenditures
 Group of additional detail: This contains YT - per capita income for Tanzi, F - a
measuring financial innovation and DUM - a dummy variable. The first two
variables represent the technology of bank transactions.
The second point is that the methods used to estimate regression are either the long-run
model or the short-run model. The third is the difference in velocity of money. The last
is that the currency is estimated at equilibrium of demand and supply equations. All this
important points will be considered to set up a new monetary model to estimate the
underground economy and tax evasion of Thailand.
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Table 5 Meta Analysis; comparison currency demand approach to estimate hidden economy and tax evasion
Year Author Variable Method Observation Velocity Results Country
1983 Tanzi





 YR
NI
WST
M
C ,,,
2
OLS 52 years
 imM
GDPV


1
Underground economy
0.6-6% of GDP and tax
evasion is 0-15 billion
U.S. dollars
USA
1998 Aslam
 DUMYINTTGDP
M
CFCA A ,,,
2
OLS 39 years
CFCA
GDPV 
Underground economy
is 29-53% of GDP and
tax evasion is 2.11-
6.95% of GDP
Pakistan
2000 Hill  FTRPXC ,,,, ECM 20 quarters 6.37.2
1
18.0 
M
pTV ,
T
NI
18.0
Underground economy
is 0.14-0.72% of GDP,
tax evasion is 1.2-5.1%
of total tax revenue
Canada
2006 Maurin
Demand:








P
YR
P
C M, ,
Supply:








,, M
MM
Y
T
P
C
P
Y
SCVAR 27 years
RC
YPV 
Hidden economy is 14-
36%of GDP
Trinidad
&Tobago
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3 ESTIMATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THAI TAX COLLECTION
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Tax and grants are the resources of government revenue. If the government expends
collection costs effectively, they can collect optimum tax revenue with low tax evasion.
For example, in the case of a highly effective tax collection, a marginal tax yield from
the marginal tax collection costs is low. The government may not need to invest too
much into tax collection effort. On the other hand, with an ineffective system of tax
collection, marginal tax yield from the tax collection effort will be higher. In this case,
the government can devote additional budget to improve its tax collection. These are the
reasons why measuring the effectiveness of tax collection is essential.
This chapter presents a model developed for estimating the effectiveness of Thai tax
collection. It comprises of two main sections aside from the introduction and conclusion.
The first section discusses a model for estimating the tax effectiveness based on three
groups of equations, i.e. tax effectiveness equation, demand and supply for currency
equations, and legal effect of tax rate equations. The demand for currency equation is
adapted from Tanzi’s monetary approach, which is used for estimating tax evasion. The
second section comprises of results and discussion. It covers three topics: the first topic
is a comparison of the results obtained from Tanzi's approach with those obtained from
the adapted model in the second section; the second topic is the development of tax
collecting capacity; and the third topic is a summary of issues for future study.
3.2 MODEL
The effectiveness model contains the effectiveness equation, the demand and supply for
currency equations and the legal effect of tax rate equations. The demand and supply
equations are used to estimate tax evasion. An increase in tax rate does not only give
raise to tax evasion but also affects negatively on the economy. This effect is defined as
the legal effect for this research. After tax evasion is estimated from the last two groups
of equations, the effectiveness equation will convert tax evasion into the tax
effectiveness.
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3.2.1 EFFECTIVENESS EQUATION
The effectiveness of tax administration is measured by the ratio of effective tax rate to
statutory tax rate (Schaffer & Turley, 2000). This method makes an argument
concerning only tax exemptions and omits tax evasion. For example, people in poor
countries have a tendency to expend a larger proportion of their income on food without
value added and excise taxes than people in developed countries. Thus the effectiveness
of poor countries, calculated from the above ratio, is less than one of developed
countries. The new effectiveness equation for this research is established with tax
evasion as the key variable.
The effectiveness of tax collection (Ef) is measured by comparing the ratio of recorded
tax revenue (Tx) to total potential tax revenue; the recorded tax revenue plus tax evasion
(TE) in the underground economy. The full capacity of the tax effectiveness is equal to
1 when there is no tax evasion as in the equation (12). In addition, to examine the
weakness in tax collection, the effectiveness will be estimated in five main taxes (i) of
Thai government revenue; individual income tax, corporate income tax, value added tax,
excise tax and custom tariff.
ii
i
i TETx
TxEf

 (12)
3.2.2 DEMAND AND SUPPLY FOR CURRENCY
According to the literature in chapter 2, tax evasion can be estimated by the TCMP
method and Tanzi’s monetary approach. In the TCMP method, tax evasion is detected
by tax auditors and included in the tax revenue, so the TCMP method presents a
different estimate of tax evasion from equation (14). Although this method is not
appropriate for measuring the overall effectiveness of the tax departments, it is good for
measuring the individual performances of tax auditors. An example of calculation and
the performance indicator will be presented in the results and discussion section.
However, the majority of this research will focus on an adapted model from Tanzi’s
monetary approach, which is used to estimate tax evasion in the underground economy
and it is assumed that this tax evasion is not included in tax revenue. Over time, his
approach has been extensively used to estimate tax evasion for many countries and in
adapting this approach, each researcher introduced some changes to suit an individual
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countries’ context. Thus the model in this research is a synthesis of the strengths of
various models, drawing from two in particular: Lacko (2000) and Maurin et al (2006).
Lacko’s model contains two tax rate variables, while Maurin et al contains a
simultaneous equation structure of currency demand and supply.
Lacko’s technique estimates the effectiveness of each tax by looking at electricity
demand. The electricity consumption model contains two tax rate variables; individual
and corporate income tax rates. These are used to estimate electricity costs and the
underground economy. Each tax rate presents the relationship between income from the
underground economy and the electricity costs. The individual income tax applies to the
income after deducting tax exemptions while the corporate income tax applies to the
profit of firms. So even if the initial income of an individual and corporate firm are
numerically equal, the resultant tax base amount will be different, and applying one
percent of tax rate will result in a different amount of tax revenue collected and this
creates different incentives to evade tax in the underground economy. This technique
will be used to estimate each tax evasion of the five main taxes.
The technique Maurin et al uses directly estimates the volume of currency from a
simultaneous equation system. This is an advancement of Tanzi’s approach which
estimates tax evasion through the ratio of currency to broad money. In this work, both
Tanzi’s and Maurin’s approach are applied and the estimates are compared.
Certain changes are introduced for this work when adapting the above approaches:
1. The supply for currency equation in this work is different from Maurin’s supply
equation. The explanation of the supply equation by Maurin is ambiguous and so a new
supply equation is established to explain the equilibrium of the demand and supply for
currency. The currency demand equation is derived from people’s behavior and the
supply equation in this research should be derived from financial institutes’ behavior.
These firms offer a deposit rate for people to make decisions on holding currency.
However, the deposit rate is not considered directly from the amount of currency but
from the amount of deposits. Interests on deposits are costs for the financial institutes;
therefore the banks’ demand for deposit is related inversely with the deposit rate as
Figure 4. Following this definition, broad money is equal to currency plus deposits (M2
= C + D) and thus the demand for deposits can be considered as the supply for currency.
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Figure 4 Demand for deposit or supply for currency
Moreover, money is an instrument of the central bank for controlling economic growth.
The central bank considers narrow money as a key variable in the transaction approach
(
1M
GNPv  ). The changes in narrow money can influence both broad money and
currency. Thus the currency supply equation in this research may contain the deposit
rate, deposits or currency, loan rate, loans and narrow money variables. These variables
will be tested for the best estimation.
2. The model should be analysed as a long-run model. Due to the process of the
estimation, the long-run model absorbs the complete information from any changes in
tax rate and reports the results at a stable state. The short run model on the other hand
shows delayed or shocked effects of changes in the tax rate in each period. For example,
the comparison between the long-run and the short-run models are presented as follows;
The long-run model can be assumed as the short form of C and T.
ttt uTC   (13)
The error term (ui) is assumed to be autoregressive.
1;1    ttt vuu ; (14)
The short-run model can be derived as an autoregressive model.
    ttttt vTTCC   11 )1(  (15)
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required deposits
Excess
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According to the process of the estimation of Tanzi, tax rate is set at zero; T = 0, for all
period t. Results of estimated C from the long-run model will be constant at α for all
period t while the short-run model estimates varied C in each period t as below
equations. At period 1 of the short-run model, estimated currency does not absorb all
information and this is shown as the error term in the result. When citizens obtain more
information about the change in tax rates, the error term will decline and value of
currency will tend to α at period infinity. This is an example of delayed effect.
t = 1, 0001 )( uTCC  
t = 2,   0
2
02 )1( uauaaC  
t = 3, 0
3
3 uaC 
t = ∞, auaC  
 0
Error Correction Mechanism (ECM) is another form of a short-run model. Its error term
distributes around the constant α and tends to α at period infinity. The long run-model
has the advantage of providing an estimation in a stable state as the error term used in
the model has no time lag effect.
3. The velocity of money, used to convert illegal money to underground economy,
should be calculated from broad money (M2). The velocity by Tanzi is calculated from
the ratio of recorded economy (GDP) to legal money (M1 - illegal money). This process
omits the illegal money and bank transactions such as cheque, paying by debit or credit
card or bank transfers. The bank transactions are defined as the legal transactions, which
can be detected the sources of money. The bank transactions and the illegal money are
circulated in the recorded economy and participate in producing not only the legal
money as in Tanzi’s approach. Without income from the underground economy or the
bank transactions, which are used to buy goods and services in the recorded economy,
the recorded economy cannot be maintained the same level by the circulation of the
legal money alone. This is the reason why the broad money, which contains legal
money plus both the illegal money and the bank transactions as deposit transaction, is
more appropriate for calculating the velocity of money. The final point of the velocity is
that the effective tax rate is calculated from tax revenue over tax base (TB) of each tax
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and so to convert the underground economy into tax evasion, the underground economy
must be based on the tax base of each tax. Thus the definition of the velocity is the ratio
of tax base over broad money;
2M
TBv 
4. There is a negative relationship between tax rate and currency, which is defined
as the legal effect. According to Tanzi’s approach, the relationship between tax rate and
currency is positive because an increase in tax rate creates an incentive for taxpayers to
evade tax by using currency to conceal their incomes. This is defined as the illegal
effect. The negative relationship is not considered in Tanzi’s model. By considering the
macro economy, tax rate is a negative multiplier for the economic system. For example,
gross domestic production will increase when a government reduces the tax rate and
currency, which is used as mediums of transactions in the economy, should increase too.
The net result of the legal effect and the illegal effect of tax rate, as derived from the
currency demand and supply equations, can be used to indicate the tax evasion effect of
the tax rate.
After considering all the mentioned issues, the currency demand and supply equations
are presented as follows;
Currency Demand equation:
         cevciii TTTTTP
C
 1ln1ln1ln1ln1lnln 543210 
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Currency supply equation:
  







p
MR
p
C 1lnlnln 210  ( 1 7 )
The equation (16) and (17) are estimated by Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).
The reason for choosing this method is that the method is appropriate to estimate with
the unknown form of heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation problems. This is the
correlation between some of the right hand side variables and the error terms of
equation. This estimator in GMM works to minimize both heteroskedasticity and
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autocorrelation. As the mentions before the Tanzi’s model should be estimated as the
long run model. Although the GMM could minimize the autocorrelation of currency
demand equation, it could not help so much with the other equations which most
variables are I (1).This is the conflict of interest between Tanzi’s technique and spurious
regression. This is a weakness that it could not be made the perfect estimation. Thus,
this research was designed to work in the long run model and leaved the simple macro
economic variables using around the world in question that they may be spurious
regressors.
To examine the best model for estimating the underground economy and tax evasion,
each variable will be tested for the highest value of adjusted R-squared and the lowest
sum of squared error of regression. After testing the significance of variables, broad
money (M2) is excluded from the demand equation. The estimation outputs of currency
demand and supply equations are presented below.
Currency Demand equation;
       evciii TTTTP
C
 1ln2908.01ln6074.1ln3238.01ln7188.0ln
(-2.759)** (1.176) (2.599)** (1.459)
      












P
GDPYR
P
WSTc ln512.1ln646.2ln1862.0ln885.11ln3761.0
(2.466)** (3.542)*** -4.090)*** (-3.027)*** (2.598)**
Adjusted R-squared = 0.9822 Durbin-Watson stat = 2.185
Currency supply equation:
  






P
MR
P
C 1ln067.1ln05520.09639.0ln
(-5.999)*** (4.7756)*** (59.95)***
Adjusted R-squared = 0.9848 Durbin-Watson stat = 0.5419
The independent variables can explain the change in the dependent variables of both the
demand and supply equations well. Most coefficients present the correct signs of the
relationships according to the reviewed assumption that the relationship between tax
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rate and currency is positive. Only the coefficient of individual income tax rate variable
presents a negative sign. This problem can be explained with the legal effect, which
influences the currency more than the illegal effect of Tanzi’s approach. Thus after
estimating the size of the legal effect from the legal equations, this leads to indicate the
illegal effect from the total effects of the currency demand and supply equations.
3.2.3 MACROECONOMIC MODEL FOR ESTIMATING THE LEGAL EFFECT
OF TAX RATE
The process for estimating the legal effect begins with estimating the simple
macroeconomic model from the aggregate demand and then examines the link between
macro data and the currency. The macroeconomic equations are presented in 6
Appendix 1: estimation output of the model. Subsequently, expenditures are chosen to
be tested for correlation with the currency. The results of the correlation test between
currency and expenditures are presented in Table 6.
Investment and import expenditures are poorly correlated with currency. In other words,
both expenditures have a tendency to use bank transactions more than currency.
Moreover, the five main taxes affect currency in the form of disposal income. The legal
effect of the tax rate will focus on significant transactions (ST) to the currency. From the
explained results in the table, the significant transaction will be PC+G+X-TXII-TXCI-
TXV-TXE-TXC, which presents the most significant correlation in the last row of Table
6.
Another interesting point of Table 6 is that GDP and ST correlate with M2 at higher rate
than C. On the other hand, citizens do not make spending decisions solely based on the
currency in their pockets but also considered their total money (M2) including their
saving, credit or loan from the banks. This point supports the velocity of money based
on M2 as mentioned before.
After estimating the entire system of equations in the effectiveness model, it can be used
to estimate the effectiveness of tax collection following the process shown in section 7
Appendix 2: Mathematical procedure of tax effectiveness.
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Table 6 Correlation between money and expenditures
C M1 M2
 
1
1



t
tt
C
CC
Ct-Ct-1
GDP 0.9731 0.9691 0.9865 -0.1009 0.2601
PC 0.9820 0.9803 0.9915 -0.1060 0.2615
I 0.7655 0.7781 0.7755 -0.0612 0.2202
G 0.9844 0.9810 0.9921 -0.1204 0.2508
X 0.9815 0.9860 0.9862 -0.1559 0.2113
M 0.9657 0.9800 0.9643 -0.1595 0.2026
PC+I 0.9397 0.9431 0.9497 -0.0937 0.2561
PC+G 0.9831 0.9811 0.9923 -0.1085 0.2599
PC+G+X 0.9868 0.9883 0.9936 -0.1348 0.2346
PC+G+X-M 0.9835 0.9726 0.9980 -0.1078 0.2598
PC+G+X+M 0.9826 0.9883 0.9866 -0.1434 0.2246
PC+G+X-TXII-TXCI-TXV-TXE-TXC 0.9873 0.9879 0.9940 -0.1373 0.2317
 
1
1



t
tt
C
CC
-0.0009 -0.0303 -0.1092 1.0000 0.8871
 
1
1



t
tt
GDP
GDPGDP
-0.4432 -0.3808 -0.4855 0.1334 -0.1365
Ct-Ct-1 0.3639 0.3360 0.2598 0.8871 1.0000
GDPt-GDPt-1 0.4420 0.5042 0.4039 -0.0496 0.0655
PCt-PCt-1 0.5829 0.6299 0.5329 0.0467 0.2065
Gt-Gt-1 0.6209 0.6676 0.6015 -0.1071 0.1210
3.3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section we will discuss three main issues comprising of 1) performance
indicators by applying the TCMP method, 2) a comparison of the results between the
adapted model and Tanzi’s monetary approach and 3) the development of the Thai tax
capacity and the effectiveness of the Thai tax collection system.
3.3.1 PERFORMANCE INDICATORS BY APPLYING THE TCMP METHOD
The tax evasion rate estimated by the TCMP method is presented in Table 7. According
to the secondary data from the revenue department of Thailand, only corporate income
tax data suits the use of estimating tax evasion by the TCMP method. Tax auditors
classify the reported corporate income into four groups: 1) claimed tax refunds; 2) non-
refunded or correct tax amount paid; 3) tax due; and 4) reduced deficit. Taxes from the
third and fourth groups are the underreported income taxes or total tax evasion. The
reduced deficit is defined as the difference in distorted deficit and true deficit. This can
be used to reduce tax when companies begin to make profit in the future. In the first
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period of years, total tax evasion was easily audited and it shows the high tax evasion at
30.25% and 16.82% in 2006 and 2007 respectively. Subsequently, the tax evasion rate
decreased to 7% at the end of 2006. This cycle repeats again in 2007 but the evading
ability of taxpayer became more complicated. By considering the tax evasion rates in
July of both years, we see that they are almost equal in July, although they were very
different in January.
The low tax evasion rate can imply both positive and negative conclusions. The low tax
evasion rate is either a result of highly effective audits or a result of ineffective audits
which lead to less detection of tax evasion and thus there is more tax evasion hiding in
the underground economy. Although the TCMP method may not be appropriate for
estimating the overall effectiveness of tax collection, the TCMP can be used as an
individual effectiveness indicator of tax auditors.
To measure the individual tax auditor’s performance, two indicators should be
measured and calculated together. The first indicator is the ratio of an individually
detected summation of erroneously reported tax (IDS) to an individual’s salary (IS). The
second indicator is calculated by applying the TCMP to individual auditors to estimate
the individually detected tax evasion. The tax evasion indicator is equal to the ratio of
individually detected tax evasion (IDTV) to an individual’s salary. Next, the first
indicator is set to have a higher weighted importance (WI) than the second indicator in a
ratio of 2:1. There are 3 reasons for each issue are as follows: 1) The first indicator
presents a general duty of tax auditors to audit both underreported and overreported tax,
2) The second indicator presents a high effort to audit tax evasion and gain more
revenue for the government and 3) if both indicators are of the same weighted
importance, some auditors may only audit for underreported taxes for the highest
performance score (PS). When underreported tax is more than overreported tax, tax
auditors cannot gain a higher performance score by detecting overreported tax as this
will be cancelled out when combining the two indictors if both indicators were given
the same weighted importance. Thus the different-weight setting can create the
incentive for auditors to audit both the highly and lowly declared incomes. The
performance score equation is presented as follow:
IS
IDTVWI
IS
IDSWIPS  21 (18)
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Table 7 Estimated tax evasion in Thai tax system by TCMP
% accumulated declared tax of total corporate income tax revenue
Month Total tax
evasion
Correct Unintended tax
evasion
(due to error)
deliberate tax
evasion
Jan-06 58.00% 42.00% 27.75% 30.25%
Feb-06 56.59% 43.41% 29.93% 26.65%
Mar-06 50.71% 49.29% 36.26% 14.45%
Apr-06 50.49% 49.51% 36.47% 14.03%
May-06 51.17% 48.83% 35.56% 15.60%
Jun-06 51.41% 48.59% 35.41% 16.01%
Jul-06 50.68% 49.32% 36.26% 14.42%
Aug-06 49.18% 50.82% 37.98% 11.20%
Sep-06 47.84% 52.16% 39.68% 8.16%
Oct-06 47.76% 52.24% 39.68% 8.08%
Nov-06 47.44% 52.56% 39.95% 7.49%
Dec-06 47.14% 52.86% 40.14% 7.00%
Jan-07 49.62% 50.38% 32.80% 16.82%
Feb-07 46.64% 53.36% 35.51% 11.14%
Mar-07 46.58% 53.42% 35.39% 11.18%
Apr-07 46.87% 53.13% 33.94% 12.93%
May-07 46.96% 53.04% 33.86% 13.09%
Jun-07 46.93% 53.07% 33.78% 13.15%
Jul-07 46.90% 53.10% 33.81% 13.08%
Remark: This table is calculated from raw data of the revenue department
These performance indicators are only useful for comparing tax auditors exposed to the
same conditions such as auditors in the same group, same responsibility area or in the
same year. They cannot be used to compare the individual performance between two
years or two departments because the behaviors of taxpayers will then be different.
The next section will focus on the estimated results of Thai tax evasion and the
effectiveness of Thai tax collection (Table 8). The results of the tax evasion will be
compared between the adapted model and Tanzi’s monetary approach. The explanation
of changes in the effectiveness of the Thai tax collection system and tax capacity will
then be described.
3.3.2 COMPARISON OF THE RESULTS BETWEEN TANZI’S MONETARY
APPROACH AND THE ADAPTED MODEL
The Thai hidden economy was estimated to be an average of 71.0% of Thailand’s GDP
for the years 1990-1993 when calculated indirectly by the electricity consume method
(Schneider, 2005) and between the range of 8-13% of GDP when calculated by the
direct survey method (Phongpaichit et al., 2000). The underground economy estimated
in Phongpaichit’s research includes other illegal activities besides tax evasion such as
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gambling and prostitution. Phongpaichit also estimates the tax evasion of that using
currency to conceal route of transaction, giving bribes and tax corruption by tax officials.
This paper’s research however does not consider other illegal activities and only
considers tax evasion of using currency to conceal route of transaction when estimating
the underground economy. With the differences in the definitions of the underground
economy and tax evasion, it is difficult to compare results between this research and
Phongpaichit’s. Thus, this research will focus on the comparison with the results of
Tanzi’ approach.
By comparison between the estimated tax evasion from Tanzi’s approach and the
adapted model in Table 8, four differences can be distinguished: 1) The adapted model
estimates tax evasion more precisely into the five main taxes; 2) The large difference
between the total estimated tax evasion rates of each method; 3) The different tax
evasion behaviors during the 1997 economic crisis and; 4) The reverse long term
tendencies between the tax evasion rates of both methods.
Table 8 Summary and comparison the results with Tanzi’s approach
%hidden economy or %tax evasion
Tanzi ii ci v e c
%Total tax
evasion of
total tax
revenue
%Total tax
evasion of
GDP
1983 51.34% 4.32% 8.45% 13.00% 18.46% 14.97% 13.50% 1.74%
1984 60.05% 6.22% 9.43% 16.15% 17.83% 18.26% 14.97% 1.95%
1985 74.21% 5.92% 8.12% 13.67% 16.94% 14.80% 13.06% 1.70%
1986 65.12% 5.11% 7.71% 11.83% 18.86% 13.40% 13.08% 1.65%
1987 56.26% 4.30% 7.67% 12.20% 21.20% 14.28% 14.43% 1.92%
1988 56.48% 4.35% 8.98% 13.63% 17.96% 16.01% 13.81% 1.97%
1989 58.33% 3.66% 9.40% 13.74% 15.25% 14.71% 12.63% 1.89%
1990 66.95% 5.01% 11.73% 15.14% 13.61% 16.39% 13.30% 2.16%
1991 67.38% 5.58% 13.42% 16.60% 15.30% 15.26% 14.05% 2.35%
1992 65.85% 4.06% 11.80% 12.14% 13.19% 11.02% 11.09% 1.68%
1993 65.77% 3.89% 12.25% 10.39% 14.16% 11.65% 11.26% 1.76%
1994 60.27% 3.84% 13.29% 10.99% 13.50% 11.30% 11.34% 1.82%
1995 58.47% 4.31% 13.12% 11.42% 12.78% 10.56% 11.02% 1.81%
1996 62.73% 4.22% 11.79% 11.87% 11.20% 8.75% 10.05% 1.68%
1997 77.72% 4.64% 10.94% 11.01% 12.05% 7.10% 9.70% 1.54%
1998 102.05% 4.25% 5.66% 10.49% 8.57% 3.99% 7.39% 1.02%
1999 59.50% 1.69% 6.19% 7.29% 8.28% 3.58% 6.05% 0.79%
2000 83.04% 2.03% 7.40% 7.11% 7.89% 4.16% 6.25% 0.84%
2001 77.12% 1.49% 6.52% 6.18% 7.21% 3.78% 5.51% 0.75%
2002 67.69% 1.53% 7.38% 6.65% 8.47% 3.99% 6.27% 0.90%
2003 65.02% 1.80% 9.14% 7.63% 9.85% 4.58% 7.47% 1.17%
2004 61.61% 1.76% 9.97% 8.05% 9.78% 3.99% 7.79% 1.25%
2005 55.92% 1.39% 10.91% 9.16% 8.78% 3.49% 8.14% 1.41%
Ave 66.04% 3.71% 9.62% 11.14% 13.09% 10.00% 10.53% 1.55%
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1. The adapted model estimates tax evasion more precisely into the five main
taxes. Tax evasion of the adapted model is estimated in each of the five main taxes
while Tanzi’s approach only estimates tax evasion of total government revenue. The
five main tax evasion rates are estimated by applying Lacko’s technique to the monetary
approach to estimate the tax effectiveness in each tax department.
The large difference of tax evasion rate between Tanzi’s (66.04%) and the adapted
model (10.53%), is 55.51% by average. This is caused by two adaptations of the
adapted model; 1) controlling change in the currency at the equilibrium of the demand
and supply equations, and 2) the new definition of the velocity of money. The second
factor has a larger impact on the difference in estimations then the first factor. The
denominator of the velocity of this research’s model (M2) is much higher than Tanzi’s
illegal money and as such the velocity of money in this research’s is much less than
Tanzi’s.
2. The estimated results of each method show a difference in tax behaviors during
the 1997 Asian economic crisis. The adapted model shows a drop in the tax evasion rate
during the crisis while Tanzi’s approach shows an increase. The drops are caused by
combining the legal effects of tax rate in consideration while the increase is caused by
the sharp increase in the velocity of illegal money. Column (9) of the Table 22
(Example to estimate the effectiveness of tax collection of individual income tax from
the model) presents an increase in currency from the legal effect of declining tax rate
during the crisis period. The legal effect enlarges the drop of illegal currency (column
(10)) and results in the drop of tax evasion rate. On the contrary, the sharp increase in
the velocity of illegal money is a result of an extreme decline in money during financial
crisis4. Consequently, this boosts the velocity up to peak. It is difficult to explain why
the illegal money had been used more often as legal money in the crisis. Because by the
definition of the illegal money, switched from the bank transactions, then the number of
the illegal transactions or the velocity of the illegal money should not increase along the
4
Before the Asian financial crisis, Thailand faced with a high balance of payment deficit. A governor
was designated to change the exchange rate system from a fixed to a managed float exchange rate. This
decision shocked the foreign investors in Thailand. They feared that the high balance of payment deficit
would make the exchange rate fall bringing loss to the holding of the Thai currency. This fear, when
combined with the above speculation, led to a panic outflow of funds causing the exchange rate drop from
25 to 56 Thai baht/US dollar in a short period. This event also caused a sharp drop in legal money
(currency) and a sharp rise in its velocity, while the velocity of M2 remained normal due to the normalcy
of bank transactions.
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velocity of legal currency but equate to the number of the original bank transactions or
velocity of M2 as mention before in 3.2.2 Demand and Supply for currency. On the
other hand, the drop in tax evasion rate in the economic crisis can be explained by two
main reasons; the decline in the effective tax rate and tax base. The decline in the
effective tax rate reduces the incentives to evade tax. The increase in number of
unemployed laborers and loss-making firms did not need to pay taxes and therefore did
not need to evade them. Another reason is the reducing tax base during the crisis with
the development of Thailand’s tax capacity. The tax capacity has been developed for
supporting the growth of the economy in the future. During the crisis, the intensity of
audits increased as tax base decrease while tax capacity – tax auditors and audit
technology – remained the same. Thus the drops in tax evasion are more reasonable
than the peak.
3. There is a difference in long term tendencies of tax evasion rates between both
methods.
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4. Figure 5 illustrates the long run downward tendencies of the tax evasion rate
from the adapted model. According to Tanzi’s approach, tax evasion rate always
increases alongside the effective tax rate because the combination between progressive
tax rates and economic growth, though audit technologies, are developed over time.
Thus methods to reduce tax evasion rate by the monetary approach are 1) to make
countries undeveloped and 2) to keep reducing the tax rate when there is economy
growth, both of which are undesirable. The long run downward tendencies of tax
evasion from the adapted model correspond with the social norms of that in the
developed countries where tax administration can control tax evasion well (IMD World
competitiveness yearbook team, 2005; Schaffer & Turley, 2000). In addition, the
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development of tax capacity can be both positive and negative depending on each tax.
Only the corporate income tax evasion rate shows the upward tendency, this will be
discussed in the next section.
Although the adapted model estimates more realistic results, a few weaknesses should
be noted. First, these equations were created specifically in the long run model to
estimate the stable state. The first problem is that some equations do not have the
cointegration between dependent and independent variables. Statistically, they may be
spurious regressions. However, most variables in this research are selected from the
reviewed short-run models. It implies that these variables were tested for a relationship
with the independent variables. The second problem is statistically insufficient 23-year
observation for various independent equations. However, using the small existing data
for estimation is better than waiting for the significant data in the future or not using
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
Year
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
ta
x
ev
as
io
n
(f
or
fiv
e
m
ai
n
ty
pe
so
ft
ax
es
) Individualincome tax
Corporate
income tax
Value added
tax
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
Year
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
ta
x
ev
as
io
n
(f
or
fiv
e
m
ai
n
ty
pe
so
ft
ax
es
)
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
ta
x
ev
as
io
n
(T
an
zi
).
Excise
Custom tariff
Tanzi
Figure 5 Comparison the tendency of percentage of tax evasion
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data at all to make policy now. Finally, the individual income tax evasion is the lowest
of the five main taxes. Due to Tanzi’s approach, a low effective tax rate causes low tax
evasion but the social norm is that individual income tax is an easily evaded tax. For
example, it is difficult for Thai tax auditors to monitor or audit the resources of income
of every workers, especially freelance and self-employed workers. Many of them
receive their incomes in cash and therefore unlike firms, need no more currency to
avoid detection of their source of their income. Declaring low income is sufficient to
evade tax while firms have to distort their income and simultaneously use currency to
hid transactions. This is the reason why the model may not estimate highly accurate tax
evasion of individual income tax. In other words, the currency approach may not be
appropriate for estimating tax evasion, which is based on a large share of currency
income from individual income tax.
3.3.3 IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THAI TAX COLLECTION
The effectiveness of overall Thai tax collection has increased significantly (Figure 6).
By considering the red line in the figure, the effectiveness of overall tax collected had
only increased slightly in the period before 1997. After 1997, the effectiveness
increased sharply during the economic crisis and then decreased near to the level it was
previously before the crisis. It can be said that without the crisis, the effectiveness has
developed only slightly. However this is a good sign of the development of the Thai tax
administration as it is still a positive increase in effectiveness.
According to the study of tax evasion, there are at least three factors influencing the
change in the effectiveness of tax collection: 1) Tax rate, 2) crisis and 3) tax capacity.
To indicate the change in the tax capacity factor, all three factors must be considered
simultaneously. The increasing tax rate causes the downward tendency of the
effectiveness, but the graph which considers all three factors illustrates an upward
tendency. This implies that the development of tax capacity has a greater influence on
the overall effectiveness than the tax rate effects or the evading tax incentive from
increasing tax rate. An analysis in detail will clarify the development of each tax.
The next section will explain the change in the tax capacity of Thai five main taxes.
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Figure 6 development of the effectiveness of Thai tax collection
1. Individual income tax
The dark blue line presents as the effectiveness of collecting individual income tax. It
was almost constant before the crisis, after which it turned to rise sharply. Noticeably,
its trend did not decline as with the other taxes. When considering with the negative
impact of increasing tax rate on tax evasion, the increase in the effectiveness of
collecting individual income tax indicates the increase in tax capacity for collection to
overcome the negative factor, both before and after the crisis.
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2. Corporate income tax
Only corporate income tax presents an almost constant tendency of effectiveness both
before and after the crisis. By considering in detail the effectiveness before and after the
crisis, both are downward trends. Thus it is difficult to say whether the tax capacity for
corporate income tax has been developed properly. There is a reason that supports the
high tax evasion in corporate income tax. Firms can declare fraudulent data in both
income and expenditure, especially labor costs. There is the large gap between a
minimum wage and a tax threshold. Any firms may declared too much labor costs
during this gap and Thai government cannot collect any more tax revenue from both
corporate and individual income tax.
3. Value added tax
The slope of the effectiveness of the value added tax line (green line) is very similar to
the total effectiveness (red line) because the value added tax is the largest share of the
total tax revenue. The major change is the tax reform in 1992 by cancelling the sales
and special business taxes and applying value added tax instead. The tax reform
impacted the structure of the tax effectiveness as can be seen from the green line which
increases significantly since then. It implies that the collecting system of the value
added tax helps to promote the effectiveness. It is a self check system between firms,
but it is less effective for the last transactions between firms and consumers who cannot
use bills to reclaim the value added tax.
4. Excise tax
Tax capacity of the excise department has been developed at the highest rate because
the change in effectiveness is due to tax capacity as the effective excise tax rate is
constant. Although the effectiveness of both the excise tax and custom tariff increase
simultaneously, the effectiveness of custom tariff has been supported by the positive
effect of declining custom tariff rate.
5. Custom tariff
The effectiveness of custom tariff collection illustrates the sharpest upward tendency
due to the continuous decline in custom tariff rate. Thus, it is difficult to determine how
the tax capacity has changed.
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The high development of effectiveness for the excise and customs departments may be
caused by a good reward incentive system for tax auditors. In comparison, tax auditors
in the revenue department do not get any rewards for detecting general errors or share
very few rewards with Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO) for deliberate tax
evasion. When auditors detect the underground income or tax evasion, they have to send
the evading tax information to AMLO. Officials of AMLO will then capture and
enforce the regulation to tax evaders. The major share of rewards will belong to
AMLO’s officials and the remaining will be rewarded to the detected tax auditors at
around 10% of fines. This is small compared to the 30-55% of summation of fines and
exhibits received by excise auditors or to the 25-35% received by customs auditors
(Source: Discipline of Ministry of Finance).
3.3.4 PLAN FOR NEXT CHAPTER AND FUTURE STUDY
After the presentation of the above research was given to the upgrade panel, they gave
useful advice for developing the research further. The most important advice for the
next chapter is a study for the structural break during the economic crisis because there
are significant drops of tax evasion during that period. This study may help to improve
estimation accuracy and reasonable explanation for the drops in tax evasion. Another
interesting advice is that the adapted model should be universal to give it the possibility
to be used in any countries’ context. For example, applying to the US context, this issue
will be presented in section 8, Appendix 3: Tanzi’s monetary approach versus the
adapted model.
The tax effectiveness model can be used for promoting the effectiveness in various
directions. The first example is using the model for the budget allocation of tax
departments. By studying the relationship between the effectiveness and budget
allocation of three tax departments, this can help the Thai government plans to invest in
each department for collecting optimum taxes. A necessary condition to achieve the
optimum points is to devote tax collection cost to the point where the marginal cost
equals the marginal tax revenue in each department. Furthermore, one should consider
the proportion of technology cost and tax official salaries as reward incentives to drive
the effectiveness of each factor to the optimum cost. This scheme can either decrease
collection costs or increase tax revenue collected.
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The second example, the relationship between the effectiveness and tax rate, can be
used as a considering condition in tax reform for maximizing the effectiveness and
promoting the vertical and horizontal equities by adjusting for the optimum tax rate.
Figure 7 presents the direction tax rates reform should take in order to promote tax
effectiveness and the horizontal and vertical equities, assuming total tax revenue
remains constant. Thai government can maintain the tax revenue by reducing the
individual income tax rate and increasing the corporate income and value added taxes.
The excise and custom tariff taxes are categorized as political taxes, which should only
be adjusted for specific political reasons such as to govern consumer behavior. In order
to manipulate the amount of tax revenue collected, it would be better to change the tax
rates of the first three taxes as opposed to political taxes. If the tax rates are changed as
recommended, the average tax effectiveness will increase from 0.92 to 0.94. Individual
income tax is a precise progressive tax while the flat rate of value added and corporate
income taxes are comparatively progressive taxes, so the tax reform can promote
vertical equity with the higher progressive tax rate. Lastly, the higher tax effectiveness
promotes the horizontal equity by reducing tax evasion. This model should be
considered for next tax reform when the Thai government desires to change the
expected tax revenue. A crucial issue for future study is the reward incentives for
controlling corruption. Due to the low tax revenue of the Thai government, the ideas
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Figure 7 Planning diagram for the tax reform
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mentioned above can be used to promote the tax effectiveness to increase tax revenue
both in the terms of tax administration (budget allocation) and tax reform for reducing
tax evasion. However this research does not attempt to form a method to deal with the
corruption problem in the Thai tax system. Corruption is a very influential factor of the
low tax revenue and a ranking done by IMD University placed Thailand at 44 out of 60
countries, with the least corrupted country at number 1. For that ranking, if the number
10 means no corruption exist in the economy, Thailand scored at 2.69 (IMD World
competitiveness yearbook team, 2005). The reward incentive is a prevalent method to
deal with tax corruption. If it is possible to set up the right reward incentive by using
game theory, this can encourage tax auditors to refuse bribes or corruption.
3.4 CONCLUSION
The purpose of this chapter is to estimate the effectiveness of tax collection. From the
review of literature on the topic of tax evasion, the effectiveness model is established by
focusing on Tanzi’s monetary approach and the TCMP method can be applied to
measure the individual tax auditor’s performance indicators. These indicators help to
promote their incentive to audit more faults both in reported income and tax evasion by
linking the performance indicators with salary promotion at the end of the fiscal year.
Coming back to the tax effectiveness model, The effectiveness model consists of three
set of equations: 1) effectiveness equation, 2) currency demand and supply equations,
and 3) legal effect equations. The effectiveness equation is used to convert the estimated
tax evasion into the tax effectiveness. The currency demand and supply equations are
adapted from Tanzi’s approach with four following issues: 1) direct estimation of
currency variable instead of the ratio of currency to M2, 2) adding up currency supply
equation including M1 and deposit rate variables for more accurate estimation, 3) tax
rate is distributed into five main taxes for estimating the effectiveness of each tax, and 4)
the model estimates the long run relationship to form an estimation of tax evasion at the
stable state when there is a change in the tax rate. The demand and supply equations are
used to estimate the total tax rate effects on currency at the equilibrium of demand and
supply. The legal effect equations, macro economic model, are used to estimate the
legal tax rate effects and indicate the illegal effects from the total effects for estimating
the underground economy and tax evasion. Basically, tax rate correlates positively with
currency by Tanzi’s assumption but the legal effects present a negative relationship.
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This is because tax rate is a negative multiplier in the macro economy and with currency
when it is a medium of transactions as this relates to the size of economy.
Firstly, the results are compared with the original method of Tanzi. There are many
differences between the estimated tax evasions from Tanzi’s approach and the adapted
model, but four interesting results should be considered: 1) Tanzi’s results present a
higher magnitude of tax evasion because of the different definition of the velocity of
money, 2) the adapted model estimates the drop in each tax evasion in the economic
crisis because of reducing the effective tax rate and the legal effects while Tanzi’s
presents the peak of tax evasion because of the velocity of money, and 3) long term
tendency of tax evasion should be both upward or downward while the long term
tendency of Tanzi’s is always upward because of increasing effective tax rate from
combination of economic growth and the progressive tax rate. The last two findings are
particularly important; the drops of tax evasion in the recession is against the general
thinking that low income countries face a high tax evasion problem and the model can
explain the decrease in tax evasion when the effective tax rate grows. However, this
research has its limitations. Firstly, there are only 23 or less observations in each model
which is quite low by statistics. Secondly, it specifically uses long run models which
may face spurious regression problem. Lastly, the tax evasion rate of individual income
may not be as low estimated because a high proportion of individual income is paid by
currency and as such taxpayers do not need any more currency to avoid detection of
source of income to evade tax.
The last section discussed about the development in tax capacity and tax effectiveness.
Factors of change in the tax effectiveness are set up as tax rate, the economic crisis and
the tax capacity. It can be concluded that total tax capacity has increased because it
overcomes the negative effect from the increase in tax rate. The tax capacity of
individual income tax, value added tax and excise tax has increased and overcomes the
negative impact of tax rate. Excise tax shows the best development in tax capacity.
Although the effectiveness of custom tariff collection increases with the sharpest rise, it
cannot be used to define the direction of change in tax capacity due to the simultaneous
decline in custom tariff tax rates. Only corporate income tax capacity presents a
downward tendency for both before and after the crisis. This may be caused by the
reward incentive system in the revenue department.
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4 TEST FOR STRUCTURAL BREAK IN TAX EVADERS’ BEHAVIOR
DURING THE ECONOMIC CRISIS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This additional chapter was advised by the upgrade panel for a more accurate estimation
of Thai tax evasion during the Southeast Asia financial crisis of 1997. Referring to
chapter 3, the high drops in tax evasion rates may have been caused by the changes in
tax evaders’ behaviors (Figure 8).
The purpose of this chapter is to test for structural breaks of tax evasion behaviors
during the crisis. The three equations which will be tested for structural breaks are the
currency demand and currency supply equations and the legal effect equation. This is
because structural breaks can occur in any process of the tax evasion estimation
especially in the legal effects (relationship of the significant transactions and tax rate).
By considering the Table 22 and Figure 8, the legal effect in column 9 show a precise
break in 1999; this is seen as a high drop of 2.24% in the significant transactions as
compared to the maximum drop from total effect (column 5) of 0.23% in 1999. The
methodology used to test the break in this chapter is a dummy variable test method with
panel data. The results will be described in both testing results of the structural break
and the estimated tax evasion results from the panel model.
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4.2 MODEL
The model in this chapter has been adapted from chapter 3 to test for the structural
breaks. Figure 8 presents various forms of breaks such as completely changed behaviors
of legal effect and interest rate after the crisis, and a shocked period of currency outflow
may only last of two years (1998-1999) after which behaviors returned to normal.
However, the model is not considered only an individual break of dependent or
independent variable but considered entire variables in the system. So the structural
breaks after considering all break variables are unknown date and unknown form.
Various forms of structural break will be trial for the best explanation of the change
after crisis.
Some examples of breaks are, 1) a shocked period which, or. One or two-year
observations are too low to confirm the structural break statistically. To make the model
more confidential, the model should be estimated in panel data as a group of countries
in Southeast Asia and South Korea because these economies were highly affected by the
crisis. Summation of those countries’ observations makes the panel model more
statistically significant. Chow test will be used in this research for test structural breaks
as constant terms or changes in slopes. The constant term break is characterized by
behavior changes at a fixed value in a period of break. The slope break is characterized
by the changing relationship between independent and dependent variables in a period
of break.
4.3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Results of this chapter will be presented in two parts; tested structural break results and
estimated tax evasion results of the panel model. The tested results present a significant
break in two equations: the currency supply equation and the legal effect equation.
4.3.1 RESULTS OF THE STRUCTURAL BREAK TEST
This section presents the tested results of the currency demand and supply equations and
the legal effect equation. The results present that the crisis dummy of the supply
equation is the best explanation for the structural break.
When the demand equation is estimated in isolation using the ordinary least squares
method (OLS), the tested results present a structural break during 1997-1998. However,
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after re-computation with the supply equation containing the 1997 crisis dummy (D97 is
0 from 1997 otherwise 1 before 1997) in the system using the two stage least squares
method (TSLS), the coefficient of the break dummy becomes insignificant. This implies
that there was no change in the currency demand behavior in the crisis but that the
structural break in currency supply from financial institutes affects indirectly on the
population’s decisions. Tested results of the demand side in isolation show a structural
break in constant term during 1997-1998 and no change in the slope of the relationship
between tax rate and currency. The coefficient of the 1997-98 dummy is tested by Wald
method which produced an F-statistic(1,136) of 4.539. This is evidence against the null
hypothesis of the coefficient = 0 at p-value = 0.0349. Wald test results also reported no
significant difference between the slopes of the tax rate variables during 1997-98 and
before or after 1997-98. This is shown in the F-statistic(1,135) of 2.103. This evidence
accepts the null hypothesis that both coefficient are equal at p-value = 0.1493. However,
by considering the re-computation in the system of currency demand and supply, the
demand break property is insignificant. By changing the method used from OLS to
TSLS and including instrument variables from the supply side, the resultant F-
statistic(1,120) is 0.3974. This evidence accepts the null hypothesis that the coefficient = 0
at p-value = 5.297; there is no structural break in the demand equation.
Final estimation output of the currency demand and supply equations does not contain
any new dummy break variables except for the previous crisis dummy in the supply side.
Disposal income variable (DI) is used in this model to compensate the legal effect. Time
variable (T) is used to replace the technology variable. The dummy variables for seven
countries are presented as Cambodia (CAM), Indonesia (IND), Malaysia (MAL),
Philippines (PHI), Singapore (SIN), South Korea (SKR) and Thailand (THA) and the
constant term presents a base case for Vietnam. By considering the supply side, the
deposit rate (R) depends on the amount of deposits (D) and the loan rate (RL).
The last equation, tested for a structural break, is the legal effect equation especially for
the relationship between currency and the significant transactions. Due to the panel
equations, the disposal income variable is used to represent the legal effect and the
macroeconomic model cannot be created in a complete system. The structural break test
is then applied to solely in the Thai context from chapter 3. The results present a
structural break of the relationship during 1997-1998. The coefficient test by Wald
method presents the F-statistic(1,21) of 3.945. This is evidence against the null hypothesis
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that the coefficient = 0 at p-value = 0.0602. The estimation output of the legal effect
equation presents as follows:
Table 9 Currency Demand equation
Dependent Variable: 





P
Cln
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares
Included observations: 133
Instrument list: ln(RL) ln(1+TR)  




 
P
TXGDPln CAM IND MAL PHI SIN SKR THA T
D97
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C (Vietnam is base case) -3.642383 0.286423 -12.71679 0.0000
ln(1+TR) 0.636707 0.101815 6.253543 0.0000
 





 
P
TXGDPln
0.807853 0.027448 29.43257 0.0000
ln(R) -0.179742 0.042152 -4.264167 0.0000
T -0.010484 0.003116 -3.364870 0.0010
CAM -0.936216 0.103772 -9.021878 0.0000
IND -0.161198 0.104010 -1.549831 0.1238
MAL -0.151412 0.074220 -2.040047 0.0435
PHI -0.254355 0.074330 -3.421951 0.0008
SIN -0.305109 0.097079 -3.142904 0.0021
SKR -0.444896 0.099371 -4.477128 0.0000
THA -0.092486 0.075388 -1.226797 0.2223
Adjusted R-squared 0.989417 Durbin-Watson stat 0.856696
Table 10 Currency supply equation
Dependent Variable: ln(R)
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares
Included observations: 102
Instrument list: ln(RL) ln(1+TR)  




 
P
TXGDPln CAM IND PHI SIN SKR THA T D97
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C (Vietnam is base case) -2.033361 0.483623 -4.204438 0.0001






P
Dln
-0.204283 0.077103 -2.649483 0.0095
ln(RL) 1.466812 0.172337 8.511305 0.0000
CAM -2.040239 0.258971 -7.878244 0.0000
IND 0.534025 0.277443 1.924806 0.0573
PHI 0.321414 0.227172 1.414850 0.1605
SIN 0.129100 0.240347 0.537139 0.5925
SKR 0.935501 0.310174 3.016050 0.0033
THA 0.516539 0.272834 1.893235 0.0615
D97 -0.292937 0.101024 -2.899671 0.0047
Adjusted R-squared 0.857024 Durbin-Watson stat 0.419011
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The structural break of legal effect equation is specifically tested for the break of the
relationship between currency (C) and the significant transactions in the Thai context
(ST). D78 is the crisis dummy which equates to 1 for the time period 1997 to 1998 and
equates to 0 otherwise.
781011.0ln9978.0596.2ln D
P
ST
P
C












(-9.518)*** (38.15)*** (-1.986)*
Adjusted R-squared = 0.9847 Durbin-Watson stat = 2.779
4.3.2 ESTIMATED TAX EVASION OF EACH COUNTRY
Tax evasion rates of the countries in Southeast Asia and South Korea are presented in
Figure 9. Most of the countries’ resultant tendencies are downward except for
Indonesia’s as Indonesia is in a recovering period after the 1997 crisis. The tax evasion
rates of Cambodia and Vietnam have fallen more sharply than other countries because
the growth rates of the illegal money of both countries are much less than the growth
rate of broad money. It implies that the ratio of the underground economy to recorded
economy has declined comparatively.
By comparison with previous literature, the ranking placement of each country from the
surveying results of International institute for management development (IMD) world
competitiveness (2005) and hidden economy around the world by electricity
consumption method (Schneider, 2005), are almost similar to the estimated ranking
results of the panel model with the exception of the placement of Thailand. (Table 11).
The questionnaires answered by private managers used by the IMD model present that
Thailand is the second most difficult country to evade tax in among the considered
countries whereas Schneider estimated that Thailand has the highest ratio of
underground economy to GDP and thus has high tax evasion. Due to the difference in
definition of the underground economy by Schneider and this research, and that the
direct method by IMD is usually more reliable than the indirect method of the electricity
consumption, thus the ranking by IMD is more appropriate for comparison with the
estimated results of the panel model. The panel model’s results are quite similar to the
ranking estimated by IMD. The ranking estimated by IMD with increasing ease to
evade tax are Singapore, Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Philippines.
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Although the estimated results of this research are slightly imprecise due to missing data
from 2005, the estimated ranking of the Philippines is obviously different between the
two methods and the ranking of Thailand has been better than Singapore’s till 2002.
These may be because of tax corruption, another kind of tax evasion, which is not
included in the estimation of this research. This can be noticeable from the high rate of
corruption by the IMD reports. It could be said that this panel model is reasonably
acceptable.
Table 11 comparison of tax evasion and underground economy rates
R
an
ki
ng
Schneider
(% of
GDP
UE
)
R
an
ki
ng
IMD
(Score)
R
an
ki
ng
Panel data
(% of
GDP
UE
)
R
an
ki
ng
Panel data
(% of
GDP
UE
)
1990-1993 2005 1990-1993 2005
1 Singapore (13) 7 Singapore (6.24) 1 Thailand (8.3) 1 Singapore (6.6)
2 Korea (38) 30 Thailand (4.45) 2 Korea (9.5) 2 Thailand (expected)
3 Malaysia (39) 31 Korea (4.43) 3 Singapore (12.7) 3 Philippines (10.2)
4 Philippines (50) 32 Malaysia (4.40) 4 Philippines (14.0) 4 Indonesia (11.8)
5 Thailand (71) 48 Indonesia (3.37) 5 Cambodia (19.5)
52 Philippines (2.73)
By comparison of Thai results between the panel model (Green line) and the adapted
model with the structural break in the relationship of currency and significant
transactions from chapter 3 (Red line) in figure 11, they are quite similar in the range of
the tax evasion rate, the downward tendencies, and the drops and recovering during the
crisis. The tax evasion rate of the panel model is dropped at a lower rate than the
adapted model at the beginning of the crisis because of the incomplete legal effect
equation. If it was possible to consider a complete legal effect for the panel model, the
tax evasion rate will increase by the multiplier of the tax rate in the macroeconomic
model.
The last issue is the consideration of the structural break in tax evasion rate during the
crisis by comparison of the legal effect between with and without the structural break.
The produced results are almost similar. This implies that the drops of the tax evasion
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rate in the crisis are cause by the high drops in effective tax rates, not by a change in
behaviors.
4.4 CONCLUSION
The purpose of this chapter is to test the structural break in the effectiveness model. Due
to the results in chapter 3, there are obvious drops of tax evasion rate during the
Southeast Asia financial crisis, 1997. Statistically, this panel model confirms the
structural break of the legal effect equation by the highly significant coefficient of break
dummy variable.
By comparing tax evasion rates of each Southeast Asia country with the ranking of IMD
world competitiveness in 2005, the ranks are almost similar in both the results of the
IMD model and this research. This implies that the panel structural break model is
reasonably acceptable. The estimated results show downward tendencies of tax evasion
rates for most countries except Indonesia. The structural break model estimates a drop
and a recovering of Thai tax evasion rate as with the results from chapter 3, but the drop
is not as large a magnitude as that of chapter 3. The most important result of the
structural break test is that the tax evasion drop in the crisis is caused by the high drop
in the effective tax rate, the break does not concern a change in behaviors.
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5 CONCLUSION
Low tax revenue is an acute problem for the Thai Government, one which causes a lack
of funds for much needed economic and social development such as improving social
welfare and the education system. The cause of the low tax revenue is ineffective tax
administration. Thus the purpose of this research is to measure the effectiveness of tax
collection in Thailand.
This research began with the review of the circumstances of the Thai tax system and tax
evasion approaches, the tax effectiveness model in this research is established by
focusing on Tanzi’s monetary approach and the TCMP method can be applied to
measure the individual tax auditor’s performance indicators for helping to promote their
incentive to audit more tax evasion.
The popular Tanzi’s monetary approach is used to estimate the level of tax evasion and
has resulted in the hypothesis that tax evasion generally increases alongside the growth
of the economy. However, Tanzi’s approach overlooks two aspects which reduce the
accuracy of the findings: velocity of money and the legal effect of the tax rate. Thus, in
this research, four adaptations, [1) direct estimation of currency variable instead of the
ratio of currency to M2, 2) adding up currency supply equation including M1 and
deposit rate variables for more accurate estimation, 3) tax rate is distributed into five
main taxes for estimating the effectiveness of each tax, and 4) the model estimates the
long run relationship to form an estimation of tax evasion at the stable state when there
is a change in the tax rate], were made in order to achieve more accurate estimation.
Furthermore, the tax effectiveness model also includes the tax effectiveness equation
and the legal tax rate effect equations not only the adapted monetary approach.
Figures suggest firstly that as the economy has grown, tax evasion has reduced, but that
secondly, the least tax evasion occurred during the economic crisis of 1997. The former
finding corresponds to the research by IMD surveys (2005) which showed that highly
developed countries have low tax evasion. The latter finding was tested for structural
break and the results support the view that there is no change in behavior during the
crisis but that the high drop of tax evasion is caused by both the legal and illegal effects
of tax rate.
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Furthermore, the tax capacities are also roughly indicated by removing the tax rate
effect and economic crisis factor off the tax effectiveness. It can be said that total tax
capacity has increased because it overcomes the negative effect from the increase in tax
rate. The tax capacities of individual income tax, value added tax and excise tax has
increased significantly while the capacities of cooperate income tax and custom tariff
cannot be firmly indicated.
By comparing estimated tax evasion rates of each Southeast Asia country from
structural break panel model with the ranking of IMD world competitiveness in 2005,
the ranks are almost similar in both the results. This implies that the panel structural
break model is reasonably acceptable. The estimated results also show downward
tendencies of tax evasion rates for most countries and the most important result of the
structural break test is that the tax evasion drop in the crisis is caused by the high drop
in the effective tax rate, the break does not concern a change in behaviors.
From the findings in this research, the applied TCMP method can be directly use to
encourage the individual tax auditors, but the results of Thai tax capacities must be
considered in the next step of government expenditure allocation for optimal budget to
each tax departments. Moreover, the characters of tax evasion collusion should be
studied to set up the new detecting reward incentive. If it possibly reaches to these
points, the Thai tax revenue must be increase to satisfactory level.
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6 APPENDIX 1: ESTIMATION OUTPUT OF THE MODELS
This research contains three models which are used in the Thai context; 1) Tanzi’s
monetary approach, 2) the adapted model and 3) structural break panel model. All the
variables in this research are denoted as follows:
List of variables
o c = Constant term in structural break demand equation presents as Vietnam
o C = Currency outside depository corporation
o Cˆ = Estimated currency at current tax rate
o Cˆˆ = Estimated currency at zero tax rate
o D = Deposit
o D97 = Dummy variable for financial crisis since 1997
o CAM = Dummy variable for Cambodia
o IND = Dummy variable for Indonesia
o MAL = Dummy variable for Malaysia
o PHI = Dummy variable for Philippine
o SIN = Dummy variable for Singapore
o SKR = Dummy variable for South Korea
o THA = Dummy variable for Thailand
o DI = Disposal income
o Ef = Effectiveness of tax collection
o Ex = Exchange rate
o G = Government expenditure
o GDP = Gross domestic product
o GWP = Gross world product
o I = Investment
o L = Loan
o M = Imports
o M1 = Narrow money
o M2 = Broad money
o NI = National income
o P = Price index
o PC = Private consumption
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o R = Deposit rate
o RD = Discount rate from central bank
o RL = Loan rate
o RW = World interest rate (LIBOR)
o SD = Significant transactions
o ST = Significant transactions
o T = Effective tax rate
o T78 = Effective tax rate during 1997-1998
o Tn78 = effective tax rate except 1997-1998
o TB = Tax base
o TE = Tax evasion
o Tx = Tax revenue
o UE = Underground economy
o v = Velocity of money
o WS = Wages and salaries
o X = Exports
o Y = Income per capita
o ?ii = Individual income tax
o ?ci = Corporate income tax
o ?v = Value added tax
o ?e = Excise tax
o ?c = Custom tariff
6.1 TANZI’S MONETARY APPROACH
Tanzi’s monetary approach is applied in the Thai context for testing. This testing proves
Tanzi’s assumption of each relationship, but the independent variables cannot
adequately explain the change in the dependent variable. The estimation output of the
equation presents the adjusted R-Squared at only 0.6841 and two insignificant
coefficients; tax rate and the ratio of wages and salaries to National income. The
adapted model presents more meaningful equations in the following tables.
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Table 12 Estimation output of Tanzi’s monetary approach
Dependent Variable: LN 





2M
C
Method: Least Squares
Date: 08/31/08 Time: 01:12
Sample(adjusted): 1982 2005
Included observations: 24 after adjusting endpoints
LN 





2M
C =c(1)+c(2)*LN(1+T)+c(3)*LN 





NI
WS +c(4)*LN(R)+c(5)*LN(Y)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
c(1) 7.748104 1.306733 5.929369 0.0000
c(2) 0.278359 0.572549 0.486175 0.6324
c(3) 0.234356 0.548008 0.427650 0.6737
c(4) -0.089179 0.039737 -2.244229 0.0369
c(5) -0.670635 0.253000 -2.650731 0.0158
R-squared 0.739026 Mean dependent var 2.118323
Adjusted R-squared 0.684084 S.D. dependent var 0.183749
S.E. of regression 0.103279 Akaike info criterion -1.519722
Sum squared resid 0.202663 Schwarz criterion -1.274294
Log likelihood 23.23666 Durbin-Watson stat 1.545534
6.2 THE ADAPTED MODEL
The adapted model in chapter 3 is presented in 3 categories of equations; 1) the
effectiveness equation, 2) the demand and supply for currency equations, and 3) the
legal effect equations. The effectiveness equation is an identity. The estimation outputs
of last two groups will be presented as follows.
1. Demand and supply for currency equations
The following shows the equilibrium of demand and supply for currency equations. The
demand for currency is based on from people’s behaviors on holding currency based on
Tanzi’s monetary approach while the supply for currency is based on financial factors
originating from financial institutions.
Table 13 estimation output of demand and supply for currency equations
Dependent Variable: LN 





P
C
Method: Generalized Method of Moments
Sample(adjusted): 1983 2005
Included observations: 23 after adjusting endpoints
Kernel: Bartlett, Bandwidth: Fixed (2), No prewhitening
Simultaneous weighting matrix & coefficient iteration
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Instrument list: LN 





P
M1 LN(1+Tii) LN(1+Tci) LN(1+Tv) LN(1+Te) LN(1+Tc)
LN 





P
WS LN(Y) LN 





P
GDP
Demand for currency
Date: 09/02/08 Time: 11:22
Convergence achieved after: 10 weight matrices, 11 total coef iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LN(1+Tii) -0.718806 0.260530 -2.759012 0.0154
LN(1+Tci) 0.323787 0.275229 1.176424 0.2590
LN(1+Tv) 0.607378 0.233652 2.599499 0.0210
LN(1+Te) 0.290831 0.199321 1.459111 0.1666
LN(1+Tc) 0.376057 0.152494 2.466037 0.0272
LN 





P
WS 1.885404 0.532298 3.542005 0.0033
LN(R) -0.186205 0.045531 -4.089598 0.0011
LN(Y) -2.645932 0.874112 -3.026995 0.0091
LN 





P
GDP 1.512243 0.582179 2.597558 0.0211
R-squared 0.988722 Mean dependent var 7.856715
Adjusted R-squared 0.982277 S.D. dependent var 0.527494
S.E. of regression 0.070225 Sum squared resid 0.069041
Durbin-Watson stat 2.185473 J-statistic 0.012565
Supply for currency
Date: 09/02/08 Time: 11:24
Convergence achieved after: 23 weight matrices, 24 total coef iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.963934 0.160675 -5.999293 0.0000
LN 





P
M1 1.066588 0.017792 59.94799 0.0000
LN(R) 0.055202 0.011559 4.775700 0.0001
R-squared 0.986187 Mean dependent var 7.856715
Adjusted R-squared 0.984806 S.D. dependent var 0.527494
S.E. of regression 0.065021 Sum squared resid 0.084555
Durbin-Watson stat 0.541919 J-statistic 0.235430
2. Legal effect equations
The legal effect equations consist of 10 equations, of which three equations are
identities. Nine equations are simple macroeconomic models and the last is an identity
of significant transactions (ST). The 10 equations comprise of 24 variables – 10
endogenous and 14 exogenous variables.
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Table 14 Estimation output of private consumption equation (PC)
Dependent Variable: LN(PC)
Method: Generalized Method of Moments
Date: 09/25/08 Time: 22:34
Sample(adjusted): 1982 2005
Included observations: 24 after adjusting endpoints
Kernel: Bartlett, Bandwidth: Fixed (2), No prewhitening
Simultaneous weighting matrix & coefficient iteration
Convergence achieved after: 1 weight matrix, 2 total coef iterations
Instrument list: Txii Txci Txv Txe Txc D97 GWP LN(X-1) LN 





RW
RD
LN(Ex-1) SD G LN(D) LN(RD) LN(L) LN(M1) P
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LN(GDP-TXII-TXCI-TXV-TXE-TXC) 0.972774 0.000340 2860.325 0.0000
R-squared 0.996829 Mean dependent var 14.28056
Adjusted R-squared 0.996829 S.D. dependent var 0.656993
S.E. of regression 0.036998 Sum squared resid 0.031484
Durbin-Watson stat 0.324022 J-statistic 0.349580
Table 15 Estimation output of investment equation (I)
Dependent Variable: LN(I)
Method: Generalized Method of Moments
Date: 09/25/08 Time: 22:36
Sample(adjusted): 1982 2005
Included observations: 24 after adjusting endpoints
Kernel: Bartlett, Bandwidth: Fixed (2), No prewhitening
Simultaneous weighting matrix & coefficient iteration
Convergence achieved after: 116 weight matrices, 117 total coef iterations
Instrument list: Txii Txci Txv Txe Txc D97 GWP LN(X-1) LN 





RW
RD
LN(Ex-1) SD G LN(D) LN(RD) LN(L) LN(M1) P
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LN(GDP) 1.352010 0.009022 149.8566 0.0000
LN(RRL) -1.300652 0.027182 -47.84942 0.0000
D97 -0.826479 0.014228 -58.08623 0.0000
R-squared 0.975623 Mean dependent var 13.65093
Adjusted R-squared 0.973301 S.D. dependent var 0.717875
S.E. of regression 0.117299 Sum squared resid 0.288938
Durbin-Watson stat 0.543493 J-statistic 0.315681
Table 16 Estimation output of export equation (X)
Dependent Variable: LN(X)
Method: Generalized Method of Moments
Date: 09/25/08 Time: 22:37
Sample(adjusted): 1982 2005
Included observations: 24 after adjusting endpoints
Kernel: Bartlett, Bandwidth: Fixed (2), No prewhitening
Simultaneous weighting matrix & coefficient iteration
Convergence achieved after: 26 weight matrices, 27 total coef iterations
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Instrument list: Txii Txci Txv Txe Txc D97 GWP LN(X-1) LN 





RW
RD
LN(Ex-1) SD G LN(D) LN(RD) LN(L) LN(M1) P
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LN( ExGWP  ) 0.017586 0.002166 8.119480 0.0000
LN(X-1) 0.992825 0.002015 492.7019 0.0000
R-squared 0.994011 Mean dependent var 13.93057
Adjusted R-squared 0.993739 S.D. dependent var 1.095924
S.E. of regression 0.086719 Sum squared resid 0.165444
Durbin-Watson stat 1.650918 J-statistic 0.358389
Table 17 Estimation output of import equation (M)
Dependent Variable: LN(M)
Method: Generalized Method of Moments
Date: 09/25/08 Time: 22:36
Sample(adjusted): 1982 2005
Included observations: 24 after adjusting endpoints
Kernel: Bartlett, Bandwidth: Fixed (2), No prewhitening
Simultaneous weighting matrix & coefficient iteration
Convergence achieved after: 77 weight matrices, 78 total coef iterations
Instrument list: Txii Txci Txv Txe Txc D97 GWP LN(X-1) LN 





RW
RD
LN(Ex-1) SD G LN(D) LN(RD) LN(L) LN(M1) P
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LN(GDP) 1.175017 0.057533 20.42321 0.0000
LN(X) 0.181048 0.036164 5.006259 0.0001
C -5.984047 0.352097 -16.99544 0.0000
R-squared 0.991780 Mean dependent var 13.95406
Adjusted R-squared 0.990998 S.D. dependent var 1.018401
S.E. of regression 0.096627 Sum squared resid 0.196073
Durbin-Watson stat 0.772591 J-statistic 0.318816
Table 18 Estimation output of interest rate equation (RL)
Dependent Variable: LN(RL)
Method: Generalized Method of Moments
Date: 08/29/08 Time: 04:59
Sample(adjusted): 1982 2005
Included observations: 24 after adjusting endpoints
Kernel: Bartlett, Bandwidth: Fixed (2), No prewhitening
Simultaneous weighting matrix & coefficient iteration
Convergence achieved after: 3 weight matrices, 4 total coef iterations
Instrument list: Txii Txci Txv Txe Txc D97 GWP LN(X-1) LN 





RW
RD
LN(Ex-1) SD G LN(D) LN(RD) LN(L) LN(M1) P
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 5.316625 0.830938 6.398345 0.0000
LN(RD) 0.298171 0.069538 4.287903 0.0004
LN(L) 0.302232 0.098585 3.065683 0.0061
66
LN(M1) -0.624653 0.163127 -3.829252 0.0010
R-squared 0.952895 Mean dependent var 2.401611
Adjusted R-squared 0.945829 S.D. dependent var 0.353952
S.E. of regression 0.082381 Sum squared resid 0.135733
Durbin-Watson stat 1.666783 J-statistic 0.001284
Table 19 Estimation output of exchange rate equation (E)
Dependent Variable: LN(E)
Method: Generalized Method of Moments
Date: 09/25/08 Time: 22:36
Sample(adjusted): 1982 2005
Included observations: 24 after adjusting endpoints
Kernel: Bartlett, Bandwidth: Fixed (2), No prewhitening
Simultaneous weighting matrix & coefficient iteration
Convergence achieved after: 48 weight matrices, 49 total coef iterations
Instrument list: Txii Txci Txv Txe Txc D97 GWP LN(X-1) LN 





RW
RD
LN(Ex-1) SD G LN(D) LN(RD) LN(L) LN(M1) P
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -1.679853 0.064071 -26.21850 0.0000
LN 





RW
RD -0.084385 0.007454 -11.32076 0.0000
LN 





M
X -0.417545 0.029531 -14.13909 0.0000
D97 -0.225844 0.011888 -18.99732 0.0000
LN(Ex-1) 0.484122 0.020007 24.19732 0.0000
R-squared 0.940299 Mean dependent var -3.393759
Adjusted R-squared 0.927731 S.D. dependent var 0.237303
S.E. of regression 0.063794 Sum squared resid 0.077324
Durbin-Watson stat 1.516335 J-statistic 0.265384
The last three equations are identities:
SDMXGIPCGDP 
 










1
100
P
P
RLRRL
cevciii TxTxTxTxTxXGPCST 
6.3 PANEL STRUCTURAL BREAK MODEL
The panel structural break model is used to test for structural breaks and estimate tax
evasion in Southeast Asia and South Korea.
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Table 20 Estimation output of structural break demand equation
Dependent Variable: LN(C)
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares
Date: 09/11/08 Time: 15:37
Sample: 1 151
Included observations: 133 Excluded observations: 18
Instrument list: LN(RL) (LNT78) LN(TN78) LN(DI) D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 T D97
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -3.679191 0.286788 -12.82894 0.0000
LN(T78) 0.610657 0.104055 5.868571 0.0000
LN(TN78) 0.623335 0.100341 6.212176 0.0000
LN(DI) 0.812383 0.027668 29.36153 0.0000
LN(R) -0.154442 0.049672 -3.109228 0.0023
T -0.008694 0.003673 -2.366604 0.0196
D1 -0.937366 0.102882 -9.111072 0.0000
D2 -0.203401 0.113403 -1.793609 0.0754
D3 -0.148646 0.073206 -2.030530 0.0445
D4 -0.277500 0.078252 -3.546238 0.0006
D5 -0.280311 0.097807 -2.865958 0.0049
D6 -0.462952 0.100740 -4.595503 0.0000
D7 -0.105780 0.076341 -1.385621 0.1684
R-squared 0.990534 Mean dependent var -2.855441
Adjusted R-squared 0.989588 S.D. dependent var 1.148651
S.E. of regression 0.117208 Sum squared resid 1.648527
F-statistic 1046.007 Durbin-Watson stat 0.837987
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Table 21 Estimation output of structural break supply equation
Dependent Variable: LN(R)
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares
Date: 09/12/08 Time: 00:06
Sample(adjusted): 5 151
Included observations: 102 Excluded observations: 45 after adjusting endpoints
Instrument list: LN(RL) (LNT78) LN(TN78) LN(DI) D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 T D97
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -2.043104 0.483685 -4.224042 0.0001
LN(D) -0.213839 0.076980 -2.777859 0.0066
LN(RL) 1.458762 0.172324 8.465244 0.0000
D1 -2.060634 0.258831 -7.961303 0.0000
D2 0.558098 0.277251 2.012971 0.0470
D4 0.340789 0.227021 1.501138 0.1367
D5 0.144406 0.240277 0.600997 0.5493
D6 0.965677 0.309890 3.116195 0.0024
D7 0.542983 0.272586 1.991967 0.0493
D97 -0.287968 0.101014 -2.850780 0.0054
R-squared 0.869719 Mean dependent var 1.777093
Adjusted R-squared 0.856974 S.D. dependent var 0.840104
S.E. of regression 0.317717 Sum squared resid 9.286850
F-statistic 68.28604 Durbin-Watson stat 0.419133
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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7 APPENDIX 2: MATHEMATICAL PROCEDURE OF TAX EFFECTIVENESS
This is an example for the calculation of the tax effectiveness of individual income tax.
The other four main taxes are calculated in the same way.
The first step is to estimate the total effect of tax rate on currency; this step is same as in
the Tanzi approach to estimating illegal money. The estimated record currency in
column (1) is calculated from the equilibrium of the demand and supply equations at the
recorded tax rates. Column (2) presents the calculated legal currency by setting the
individual income tax rate at zero. Difference between the two estimated currencies as
shown in (3) is converted to total tax rate effects on currency in (5) by dividing with M2
in (4). The total effects are presented as a percent change of currency per unit of broad
money (M2).
The second step is to estimate the legal tax rate effects on currency through the
significant transactions (ST) from the legal effect equations. The process of the
calculation is similar to the first process. ST is calculated twice; at the recorded and zero
individual income tax rates. The results are shown in column (6) and (7). The
percentage change of ST is defined as the legal tax rate effect in column (9). The illegal
tax rate effect in column (10) is indicated as the legal effect (9) subtracted from the total
effect (5). The velocity of money (v) in (13) is defined as the tax base over broad
money 






2M
tbv . The illegal effect (10) multiplied by M2 (4) is illegal money (IM, 11).
The underground economy (UE, 14) is estimated by the multiplication of illegal money
(IM, 11) and the velocity of money (v, 13).
Tax evasion (16) is estimated as the underground economy (14) multiplied by the tax
rate (16). Finally, the effectiveness of tax collection (18) is estimated from the ratio of
the tax revenue (17) to tax evasion (16) plus the tax revenue (17).
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Table 22 Example to estimate the effectiveness of tax collection of individual income tax from the model
Millions of baht
Cˆ iiC
ˆ
ˆ
iiCC
ˆ
ˆˆ
 M2








 iiCC
ˆ
ˆˆ% ,
Total effect
^
ST iiST
^
^
iiSTST
^
^^











 iiSTST
^
^^
% ,
legal effect illegal effect IMii TBii Vii UEii Txii Tii TEii eii
(3)= (5)= (8)= (9)= (10)= (11)= (13)= (14)= (16)= (18)=(1) (2)
(1)-(2)
(4)
 
 
100
4
3

(6) (7)
(6)-(7)
 
 
100
6
8
 (5)-(9)
 
 4
100
10

(12)
 
 4
12
   1312 
(15)
 
 12
15
(17)
 
   1715
15

1983 58,597 70,792 -12195 491,774 -2.48% 728,699 778,224 -49,525 -6.80% 4.32% 21227 713,156 1.4502 30,783 15,397 2.16% 665 0.9586
1984 63,277 77,226 -13949 588,509 -2.37% 668,271 725,665 -57,394 -8.59% 6.22% 36595 759,236 1.2901 47,211 17,919 2.36% 1114 0.9415
1985 61,718 75,982 -14264 655,980 -2.17% 803,016 868,018 -65,002 -8.09% 5.92% 38836 810,837 1.2361 48,004 20,619 2.54% 1221 0.9441
1986 72,212 88,042 -15830 745,349 -2.12% 888,280 952,577 -64,297 -7.24% 5.11% 38122 857,360 1.1503 43,851 20,059 2.34% 1026 0.9513
1987 90,997 109,762 -18765 890,187 -2.11% 1,068,146 1,136,621 -68,475 -6.41% 4.30% 38301 969,743 1.0894 41,724 20,645 2.13% 888 0.9587
1988 103,317 125,822 -22505 1,050,090 -2.14% 1,338,772 1,425,750 -86,978 -6.50% 4.35% 45718 1,133,965 1.0799 49,370 26,269 2.32% 1144 0.9583
1989 123,199 149,874 -26675 1,324,970 -2.01% 1,769,191 1,869,554 -100,363 -5.67% 3.66% 48488 1,341,706 1.0126 49,100 30,793 2.30% 1127 0.9647
1990 136,546 170,830 -34284 1,663,090 -2.06% 1,911,957 2,047,174 -135,217 -7.07% 5.01% 83333 1,508,631 0.9071 75,593 43,860 2.91% 2198 0.9523
1991 157,559 198,268 -40709 1,985,650 -2.05% 2,105,785 2,266,540 -160,755 -7.63% 5.58% 110875 1,704,523 0.8584 95,177 51,953 3.05% 2901 0.9471
1992 176,215 219,751 -43536 2,293,700 -1.90% 2,701,849 2,862,776 -160,927 -5.96% 4.06% 93081 1,881,657 0.8204 76,360 53,280 2.83% 2162 0.9610
1993 211,994 264,924 -52930 2,729,300 -1.94% 3,113,383 3,294,781 -181,398 -5.83% 3.89% 106090 2,078,256 0.7615 80,783 59,869 2.88% 2327 0.9626
1994 239,087 301,157 -62070 3,020,950 -2.05% 3,701,737 3,919,876 -218,139 -5.89% 3.84% 115951 2,292,077 0.7587 87,975 70,419 3.07% 2703 0.9630
1995 274,022 350,176 -76154 3,556,950 -2.14% 4,372,222 4,654,470 -282,248 -6.46% 4.31% 153465 2,664,038 0.7490 114,940 91,795 3.45% 3960 0.9586
1996 293,014 380,238 -87224 3,934,710 -2.22% 5,108,795 5,437,822 -329,027 -6.44% 4.22% 166187 2,893,821 0.7355 122,224 112,306 3.88% 4743 0.9595
1997 309,354 400,850 -91496 4,703,970 -1.95% 4,699,817 5,009,221 -309,404 -6.58% 4.64% 218182 3,030,574 0.6443 140,565 116,291 3.84% 5394 0.9557
1998 300,664 393,083 -92420 5,177,640 -1.78% 4,753,289 5,040,223 -286,934 -6.04% 4.25% 220130 3,111,927 0.6010 132,305 127,817 4.11% 5434 0.9592
1999 413,073 521,108 -108035 5,374,340 -2.01% 5,747,296 5,960,111 -212,815 -3.70% 1.69% 90970 3,098,578 0.5766 52,449 96,375 3.11% 1631 0.9834
2000 366,023 459,546 -93523 5,638,110 -1.66% 5,760,331 5,972,574 -212,243 -3.68% 2.03% 114216 3,198,598 0.5673 64,797 95,711 2.99% 1939 0.9801
2001 398,541 502,842 -104301 5,945,710 -1.75% 6,891,106 7,114,774 -223,668 -3.25% 1.49% 88682 3,277,556 0.5512 48,886 102,050 3.11% 1522 0.9853
2002 448,424 568,762 -120339 6,170,730 -1.95% 6,940,778 7,182,384 -241,606 -3.48% 1.53% 94462 3,397,192 0.5505 52,005 110,319 3.25% 1689 0.9849
2003 527,357 671,320 -143962 6,849,560 -2.10% 6,920,955 7,191,304 -270,349 -3.91% 1.80% 123598 3,684,707 0.5379 66,489 123,163 3.34% 2222 0.9823
2004 568,938 724,783 -155845 7,222,780 -2.16% 7,615,124 7,913,082 -297,958 -3.91% 1.76% 126761 4,061,436 0.5623 71,279 136,545 3.36% 2396 0.9828
2005 620,449 791,086 -170636 7,646,870 -2.23% 8,855,144 9,175,847 -320,703 -3.62% 1.39% 106307 4,396,444 0.5749 61,120 148,815 3.38% 2069 0.9863
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8 APPENDIX 3: TANZI’S MONETARY APPROACH VERSUS THE ADAPTED
MODEL
This section has the purpose to recheck 1) how is Tanzi’s approach used, and 2) can the
adapted model be used universally or not, due to the reason that there are significant
differences between the results of Tanzi’s approach and the adapted model.
In order to check Tanzi’s approach, his data was taken and calculated according to the
process he lays out in his approach. The produced results were not similar to what he came
up with. On closer observation, there are two doubts about the adjustments made in his
calculated results. The first adjustment in doubt is the amount of illegal money; this is for
scaling the size of tax evasion down. It is noticed that the figure for illegal money is
negative in 1930-1931. As there is a positive relationship between tax rate and currency,
the positive tax rate should not product the negative illegal money. The second adjustment
in doubt is the tax evasion results by using the data from Tanzi’s paper, the average tax rate
in the paper is a lot lower than the effective tax rate so the results produced from the
effective tax rate were much higher then that the published results in the paper. The reason
for the oddly low tax evasion in Tanzi’s research is unacceptable, however the reason for
the extremely high results using Tanzi’s approach in the Thai context can be explained by
the velocity of legal money. It could be confirmed that Tanzi’s results are correct
calculations as the process in the literature though the track of calculation shows different
results.
The adapted model is applied to the updated United State context to recheck the universal
property. With updated data, estimation output of Tanzi’s approach (Table 23) presents
Adjusted R-squared at 0.8003, while both outputs of the adapted model (total effective tax
rate variable and four main effective tax rate variables) present higher Adjusted R-squared
at 0.9862 (Table 24) and 0.9841 (Table 25) respectively. These present the universal
appropriation for estimating tax evasion.
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Table 23 Estimation output of Tanzi’s monetary approach
Dependent Variable: LN 





2M
C
Method: Least Squares
Date: 07/02/08 Time: 18:28
Sample(adjusted): 1960 2007
Included observations: 48 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
c -8.460516 3.624222 -2.334436 0.0243
LN(T) 2.130823 0.343692 6.199810 0.0000
LN 





NI
WS -0.944180 0.830698 -1.136611 0.2620
LN(R) -0.228089 0.025408 -8.977018 0.0000
LN(Y) 0.363130 0.080340 4.519931 0.0000
R-squared 0.817299 Mean dependent var -2.512311
Adjusted R-squared 0.800303 S.D. dependent var 0.193710
S.E. of regression 0.086564 Akaike info criterion -1.957532
Sum squared resid 0.322213 Schwarz criterion -1.762615
Log likelihood 51.98077 F-statistic 48.08917
Durbin-Watson stat 1.072836 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Table 24 Estimation output of demand and supply for currency equation in form A
Dependent Variable: LN 





P
C
Method: Generalized Method of Moments
Date: 09/19/08 Time: 21:16
Sample(adjusted): 1960 2007
Included observations: 48 after adjusting endpoints
Kernel: Bartlett, Bandwidth: Fixed (3), No prewhitening
Simultaneous weighting matrix & coefficient iteration
Convergence achieved after: 3 weight matrices, 4 total coef iterations
Instrument list: LN(RL) LN(T) LN 





P
WS LN(Y)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LN(T) 0.850564 0.178861 4.755444 0.0000
LN 





P
WS 1.715489 0.072268 23.73795 0.0000
LN(R) -0.204452 0.015527 -13.16742 0.0000
LN(Y) -0.691707 0.074204 -9.321740 0.0000
R-squared 0.987097 Mean dependent var 0.945478
Adjusted R-squared 0.986217 S.D. dependent var 0.519289
S.E. of regression 0.060964 Sum squared resid 0.163532
Durbin-Watson stat 1.094194 J-statistic 0.000123
Dependent Variable: LN(R)
Method: Generalized Method of Moments
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Date: 09/19/08 Time: 21:20
Sample(adjusted): 1960 2007
Included observations: 48 after adjusting endpoints
Kernel: Bartlett, Bandwidth: Fixed (3), No prewhitening
Simultaneous weighting matrix & coefficient iteration
Convergence achieved after: 9 weight matrices, 10 total coef iterations
Instrument list: LN(RL) LN(T) LN 





P
WS LN(Y)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
c 0.872052 0.285538 0.0038
LN 





P
D -0.462636 0.076139 0.0000
LN(RL) 1.226537 0.076945 0.0000
R-squared 0.888013 Mean dependent var 1.750050
Adjusted R-squared 0.883035 S.D. dependent var 0.529921
S.E. of regression 0.181233 Sum squared resid 1.478049
Durbin-Watson stat 0.453564 J-statistic 0.037064
Table 25 Estimation output of demand and supply for currency equation in form B
Dependent Variable: LN(
P
C )
Method: Generalized Method of Moments
Date: 09/19/08 Time: 21:27
Sample(adjusted): 1960 2007
Included observations: 48 after adjusting endpoints
Kernel: Bartlett, Bandwidth: Fixed (3), No prewhitening
Simultaneous weighting matrix & coefficient iteration
Convergence achieved after: 1 weight matrix, 2 total coef iterations
Instrument list: LN(TPI) LN(TCI) LN(TPC) LN 





P
WS LN(Y) LN 





P
GDP LN(RL)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
c 25.05040 8.739238 2.866428 0.0066
LN(TPI) 0.314232 0.240899 1.304412 0.1995
LN(TCI) 0.191123 0.124627 1.533557 0.1330
LN(TPC) 0.092740 0.297529 0.311701 0.7569
LN 





P
WS 1.606667 0.672924 2.387591 0.0218
LN(R) -0.208578 0.031802 -6.558687 0.0000
LN(Y) -3.957364 1.151575 -3.436480 0.0014
LN(GDP/P) 2.280327 0.940903 2.423553 0.0200
R-squared 0.986428 Mean dependent var 0.945478
Adjusted R-squared 0.984053 S.D. dependent var 0.519289
S.E. of regression 0.065576 Sum squared resid 0.172008
Durbin-Watson stat 1.108860 J-statistic 3.43E-20
Dependent Variable: LN(R)
Method: Generalized Method of Moments
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Date: 09/19/08 Time: 21:27
Sample(adjusted): 1960 2007
Included observations: 48 after adjusting endpoints
Kernel: Bartlett, Bandwidth: Fixed (3), No prewhitening
Simultaneous weighting matrix & coefficient iteration
Convergence achieved after: 23 weight matrices, 24 total coef iterations
Instrument list: LN(TPI) LN(TCI) LN(TPC) LN 





P
WS LN(Y) LN 





P
GDP LN(RL)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
c 0.507561 0.230427 2.202698 0.0328
LN 





P
D -0.698363 0.067640 -10.32471 0.0000
LN(RL) 1.808461 0.100421 18.00871 0.0000
R-squared 0.839705 Mean dependent var 1.750050
Adjusted R-squared 0.832580 S.D. dependent var 0.529921
S.E. of regression 0.216827 Sum squared resid 2.115635
Durbin-Watson stat 0.467274 J-statistic 0.084671
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